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I. INTRODUCTION 
 The breakup of AT&T represents perhaps the most dramatic landmark 
of a fundamental shift in U.S. telecommunications policy.1 Until the 1960s, 
policymakers generally regarded the entire telephone network as being 
inherently monopolistic.2 Over time, technological developments made 
competition possible in complementary products and services offered 
through the local telephone network, such as the telephone equipment 
located in residences and business offices (known as “customer premises 
equipment” or “CPE”),3 long-distance service, and the new set of services 
that combined computing power with transmission to provide innovative 
new services that went far beyond traditional voice communications 
(originally called “enhanced services” and later called “information 
services”). The order mandating the breakup of AT&T, commonly known 
as the Modification of Final Judgment (MFJ), attempted to promote 
competition in those services by mandating that the newly created Bell 
Operating Companies provide rival providers with equal access to their 
local telephone networks.4  
 The MFJ only provided for access to providers of complementary 
services. It did not envision direct competition in the local telephone 
 
 1. See United States v. AT&T Co., 552 F. Supp. 131 (D.D.C. 1982), aff’d mem. sub 
nom. Maryland v. United States, 460 U.S. 1001 (1983). Some commentators have observed 
that regulators had already begun to impose many of the access requirements imposed by 
the decision long before the federal government brought its antitrust suit against AT&T. 
See, e.g., Glen O. Robinson, The Titanic Remembered: AT&T and the Changing World of 
Telecommunications, 5 YALE J. ON REG. 517 (1988) (book review). The decision 
nonetheless remains the most salient example of this fundamental change in regulatory 
approach.  
 2. See, e.g., GERALD R. FAULHABER, TELECOMMUNICATIONS IN TURMOIL 107 (1987); 
PETER W. HUBER, MICHAEL K. KELLOGG, & JOHN THORNE, FEDERAL TELECOMMUNICATIONS 
LAW § 2.1.1 (2d ed. 1999). 
 3. This is in contrast to “telecommunications equipment,” which refers to the wires 
and switches located outside end-users’ premises that connected those premises together. 
 4. United States v. AT&T Co., 552 F. Supp. at 161-62. 
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network.5 Technology would soon transform that portion of the network, as 
new fiber-optic and wireless-based technologies allowed competition in 
local telephone service to emerge as well. As a result, Congress enacted the 
Telecommunications Act of 19966 (1996 Act) and included in it a range of 
access requirements that went far beyond those required by the MFJ.7 The 
FCC implemented these new requirements through a regime known as 
Total Element Long Run Incremental Cost (TELRIC), which based access 
prices on the long-run, forward-looking cost of elements to which the 
requesting company sought access.8 
 This approach taken by Congress and the FCC suffers from several 
conceptual shortcomings. It overlooks the fact that the emergence of 
competition undermines many of the basic rationales for regulation. In 
addition, a cost-based approach to access pricing, in effect, treats each 
network element as if it existed in a vacuum. In so doing, it fails to capture 
the interactions between different network components that allow networks 
to compensate for limitations in capacity and unexpected changes in 
network flows by routing traffic along different pathways. It is quality that 
causes networks to behave as complex systems in ways that can be 
discontinuous and quite unpredictable. Finally, using the same 
methodology to implement many of the access requirements currently 
embodied in U.S. telecommunications policy in effect treats them as if they 
were conceptually the same. The lack of an overarching theory of network 
design ignores the fact that different forms of access have different 
implications for network configuration, capacity, reliability, and cost. 
 This Article seeks to rectify these shortcomings. Part II describes the 
early state and federal efforts to regulate local telephone networks and 
traces the emergence of competition and the ways in which the regulatory 
regime adapted in response. Part III reviews the basic rationales for 
regulating local telephone networks and critiques their continued 
applicability. Part IV analyzes access through an approach we have 
 
 5. See Verizon Comm., Inc. v. FCC, 535 U.S. 467, 475-76 (2001) (noting that at the 
time of the breakup of AT&T, local telephone service was “thought to be the root of natural 
monopoly in the telecommunications industry”); United States v. W. Elec. Co., 673 F. Supp. 
525, 537-38 (D.D.C. 1987), aff’d, 894 F.2d 1387 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (concluding that local 
telephone service “is characterized by very substantial economies of scale and scope” and 
that “[t]he exchange monopoly of the Regional Companies has continued because it is a 
natural monopoly”); STEPHEN BREYER, REGULATION AND ITS REFORM 291 (1982) (“Local 
telephone service seems to be generally accepted as a natural monopoly.”); 2 ALFRED E. 
KAHN, THE ECONOMICS OF REGULATION: PRINCIPLES AND INSTITUTIONS 127 (1971) (“That 
the provision of local telephone service is a natural monopoly is generally conceded.”). 
 6. Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104, 110 Stat. 56 (1996) 
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 47 U.S.C. (2000)). 
 7. See infra notes 49-61 and accompanying text. 
 8. See infra notes 56-59 and accompanying text. 
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developed based on the branch of mathematics known as graph theory that 
captures the interactions between network components that are one of the 
most distinctive qualities of networks.9 In so doing, we apply a five-part 
system that we have developed for classifying different forms of access10 to 
gain insight into the problems and distortions caused by the existing 
regulatory regime.  
II. THE HISTORY OF THE REGULATION OF LOCAL TELEPHONY 
A. Early State and Federal Regulation 
 Under the system of federalism enshrined in the U.S. Constitution, the 
authority of the federal government is limited to interstate commercial 
activities. The regulation of intrastate telephone rates fell within the 
jurisdiction of the states.11 Although early legislation in five states had 
authorized some degree of regulation over local telephone companies, state 
regulation of local telephone service did not begin in earnest until 1907 
when states began authorizing their public utility commissions to oversee 
the reasonableness of local telephone rates. By 1921, all but three states 
had instituted some form of regulation of local telephone rates.12  
 Federal regulation of interstate telephone service began in 1910 with 
the enactment of the Mann-Elkins Act,13 which declared interstate 
telephone and telegraph companies to be common carriers subject to the 
duty to provide service upon any reasonable request at “just and reasonable 
 
 9. See Daniel F. Spulber & Christopher S. Yoo, On the Regulation of Networks as 
Complex Systems: A Graph Theory Approach, 99 NW. U. L. REV. 1687, 1693-1707 (2005). 
 10. See Daniel F. Spulber & Christopher S. Yoo, Network Regulation: The Many Faces 
of Access, 1 J. COMPETITION L. & ECON. 635 (2005). 
 11. See, e.g., Smith v. Ill. Bell Tel. Co., 282 U.S. 133, 148-49 (1930). Such a vision of 
dual federalism can be hard to maintain with respect to network industries such as 
telephony, in which the same capital assets are used for both intrastate and interstate service. 
With respect to other network industries, such as the railroads, the Supreme Court has 
acknowledged that intrastate and interstate rates “are so related that the government of the 
one involves the control of the other” and has recognized that the federal government cannot 
create a coherent regulatory system without authority over both. Houston & Tex. Ry. v. 
United States (Shreveport Rate Case), 234 U.S. 342, 351 (1914); accord Wickard v. Filburn, 
317 U.S. 111, 125 (1942) (recognizing that purely intrastate activities can have a tangential 
impact on interstate commerce sufficient to bring those activities within federal 
jurisdiction). This reasoning has not been extended to telephony prior to 1996. See, e.g., La. 
Pub. Serv. Comm’n v. FCC, 476 U.S. 355 (1986); Smith, 282 U.S. at 148-49. 
 12. H.R. REP. NO. 67-109, at 3 (1921); Consolidation of Competing Telephone 
Companies: Joint Hearings on S. 1313 Before the Comm. on Interstate Commerce, 67th 
Cong. 4, 5 (1921) (statement of F.B. MacKinnon, President, U.S. Indep. Tel. Ass’n); J. 
WARREN STEHMAN, THE FINANCIAL HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN TELEPHONE AND TELEGRAPH 
COMPANY 164-67 (Augustus M. Kelley 1967) (1925). 
 13. Mann-Elkins Act, Pub. L. No. 61-218, ch. 309, §§ 7, 12, 36 Stat. 539, 544-46, 551 
(1910). 
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rates.”14 The Act also gave the Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC) the 
power to overturn rates that it found to be “unjust or unreasonable or 
unjustly discriminatory or unduly preferential or prejudicial,”15 but it did 
not give the ICC the authority to require the filing of tariffs or mandate 
interconnection ex ante, which had the effect of limiting it to ex post 
review of rates.16 In addition, during this period the ICC focused its 
attention primarily on the railroads. As a result, the ICC did little to 
exercise the scant regulatory jurisdiction over telephone service that it did 
possess, undertaking only four telephone rate cases during the twenty-four 
years during which it had jurisdiction over the telephone industry.17  
 Congress addressed many of the deficiencies of the Mann-Elkins Act 
when enacting the Communications Act of 1934.18 In addition to giving the 
newly created FCC the authority to ensure that interstate telephone rates 
were just, reasonable, and nondiscriminatory, the Act also addressed the 
ICC’s lack of authority to require tariffs by requiring all interstate carriers 
to file schedules of charges.19 At the same time, the Act preserved the 
preexisting division between federal and state authority by including 
language providing that “nothing in this chapter shall be construed to apply 
or to give the Commission jurisdiction with respect to . . . charges, 
classifications, practices, services, facilities, or regulations for or in 
connection with intrastate communication service . . . of any carrier.”20 The 
Act also gave the FCC the authority to oversee what became known as the 
“separations” process, through which the agency would determine what 
 
 14. Id. at ch. 309, § 7, 36 Stat. at  545. 
 15. Id. at ch. 309 § 12, 36 Stat. at 551. 
 16. Id. at § 7, 12. See also, W. Union Tel. Co. v. Esteve Bros., 256 U.S. 566, 573 
(1921); Unrepeated Message Case, 44 I.C.C. 670, 673-74 (1917). 
 17. Whittaker, 59 I.C.C. 286 (1920); Commercial Cable Co., 45 I.C.C. 33 (1917); 
Malone, 40 I.C.C. 185 (1916); W. N. White & Co., 33 I.C.C. 500 (1915). See generally 
FCC: Hearings on H.R. 8301 Before the House Comm. on Interstate and Foreign 
Commerce, 73d Cong. 69 (1934) [hereinafter 1934 House Hearings] (statement of Paul 
Walker) (observing that “it is known to everyone that the Interstate Commerce Commission 
has never found it practical to do anything toward the regulation of telephone rates”), 
reprinted in A LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE COMMUNICATIONS ACT OF 1934, at 343, 415 
(Max D. Paglin ed., 1989); I.L. SHARFMAN, THE INTERSTATE COMMERCE COMMISSION: A 
STUDY IN ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND PROCEDURE part 2, 110 (1931) (observing that “[i]n 
practice, . . . there has been no extensive exercise of these broad powers” over interstate 
communications by the ICC); Glen O. Robinson, Title I: The Federal Communications Act: 
An Essay on Origins and Regulatory Purpose, in LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra at 7 (noting 
“a general consensus that the ICC did not aggressively implement its new mandate”). 
 18. Communication Act of 1934, Pub. L. No. 73-416, chap. 652, 48 Stat. 1064 (current 
version at 47 U.S.C. § 151 et seq (2000)). 
 19. See 47 U.S.C. §§ 201(b), 202(a), 203. 
 20. Id. §152(b). 
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proportion of the costs of capital equipment used for both local and long 
distance would be allocated to each service.21 
B. The Emergence of Competition in Complementary Services 
 From the time of the enactment of the 1934 Act until the mid-1960s, 
regulators and the Bell System entered into a symbiotic relationship. The 
regulatory authorities condoned the Bell System’s monopolization of all 
aspects of the telephone network. Monopoly control allowed regulators to 
authorize charging above cost for certain services and to use the excess 
returns to cross-subsidize other services that were more popular with 
regulatory constituencies. For example, the FCC used its control over the 
separations process to allocate to long-distance rates an ever-increasing 
proportion of the costs of the capital equipment used to provide both local 
and long-distance service—such as CPE, the wires connecting individual 
customers’ premises to central offices (commonly known as “local loops”), 
and the switching equipment located in central offices.22 The higher long-
distance charges were thus used to keep monthly charges for local 
telephone service low. Similarly, state regulatory authorities used higher 
charges on business users to cross-subsidize the rates paid by residential 
users. Finally, regulatory authorities used a system known as “rate 
averaging” to mandate that all telephone subscribers in the state pay the 
same rates for service. The effect was to require lower-cost urban users to 
cross-subsidize the service for higher-cost rural users. The Bell System, 
which by this time had established a pattern of cooperating with regulatory 
authorities, acceded. So long as the resulting rates protected its aggregate 
rate of return, it had little concern over the allocation of that revenue across 
different customers and services.23 
 Over time, outside forces began to undercut this cozy arrangement. 
First, after a long period of rate decreases during the 1940s and 1950s, the 
Bell System began to seek increases in long-distance rates. Complaints 
from members of Congress and the General Services Administration 
prompted the FCC to initiate its first systematic analysis of the Bell 
System’s costs, which revealed wide disparities in rates of return across 
seven different classes of interstate service. As a result, the FCC abandoned 
its system of “continuing surveillance,” in which long-distance rates were 
established through informal negotiations between AT&T and the FCC, in 
 
 21. Id. § 221(c). 
 22. PETER TEMIN, THE FALL OF THE BELL SYSTEM 25-27 (1987). 
 23. See David L. Kaserman & John W. Mayo, Cross-Subsidies in Telecommunications: 
Roadblocks on the Road to More Intelligent Telephone Pricing, 11 YALE J. ON REG. 119, 
131, 142-46 (1994); Howard A. Shelanski, Adjusting Regulation to Competition: Toward a 
New Model for U.S. Telecommunications Policy, 24 YALE J. ON REG. 55, 59-60 (2007). 
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favor of a more formal regulatory regime based on cost-of-service 
ratemaking.24  
 In addition, competition began to emerge from providers of 
complementary services. For example, producers of CPE began to seek 
access to the Bell System’s local telephone networks. “Foreign 
attachments” provisions contained in the Bell System’s tariffs prohibited 
the interconnection of any CPE not manufactured by the Bell System’s 
manufacturing subsidiary, Western Electric. After some prodding by the 
courts,25 the FCC issued its landmark Carterfone decision,26 which 
eventually led to the adoption of the Part 68 rules requiring the Bell System 
to open its network to any CPE that met specified requirements.27 
 The emergence of microwave as a means of transmission allowed 
competition to emerge in long distance as well. A new company called 
Microwave Communications, Inc. (later better known as MCI) realized that 
it could expand its private line services—which were designed to serve 
companies with multiple offices in distant locations, both by connecting 
those offices together and by providing connections to the local telephone 
networks surrounding each location—to provide long-distance service as 
well. Again, after some prodding by the courts,28 the FCC acceded and 
allowed competition in long-distance service to emerge.29 
 In addition, a new set of services, originally called “enhanced 
services” and later called “information services,” began to emerge, which 
combined computing power with transmission to provide innovative new 
services that went far beyond traditional voice communications.30 Some of 
 
 24. Charges for Interstate & Foreign Comm., Memorandum Opinion and Order, 2 
F.C.C.2d 871, 871-72 paras. 1-2 (1965). 
 25. See Hush-a-Phone Corp. v. United States, 238 F.2d 266, 269 (D.C. Cir. 1956) 
(recognizing every subscriber’s right “to use his telephone in ways which are privately 
beneficial without being publicly detrimental”). 
 26. Use of the Carterfone Device in Message Toll Telephone Service, Decision, 13 
F.C.C.2d 420, 13 Rad. Reg. 2d (P & F) 597 (1968). 
 27. Proposals for New or Revised Classes of Interstate & Foreign Message Toll Tel. 
Ser. (MTS) & Wide Area Tel. Serv. (WATS), First Report and Order, 56 F.C.C.2d 593 
(1975) (codified at 47 C.F.R. pt. 68 (2008)). 
 28. See MCI Telecomm. Corp. v. FCC, 561 F.2d 365 (D.C. Cir. 1977); MCI Telecomm. 
Corp. v. FCC, 580 F.2d 590 (D.C. Cir. 1978). 
 29. MTS and WATS Market Structure, Report and Third Supplemental Notice of 
Inquiry and Proposed Rulemaking, 81 F.C.C.2d 177, 48 Rad. Reg. 2d (P & F) 67 (1980). 
 30. The FCC defined enhanced services as “services, offered over common carrier 
transmission facilities used in interstate communications, which employ computer 
processing applications that act on the format, content, code, protocol or similar aspects of 
the subscriber’s transmitted information; provide the subscriber additional, different, or 
restructured information; or involve subscriber interaction with stored information.” 
Amendment of Section 64.702 of the Comm’n’s Rules & Regs. (Second Computer Inquiry), 
Order, 77 F.C.C.2d 384, 498 paras. 233-60 (1980) [hereinafter Computer Inquiry II] 
(codified at 47 C.F.R. § 64.702(a) (2008)), aff’d sub nom. Computer & Comm. Indus. Ass’n 
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these services were dial-up services, the predecessors to the modern 
Internet, which used analog modems to make it possible for the first time to 
connect computers to the network. Other services harnessed computing 
power in the network itself, typically in the newly digitized switches, to 
provide new services, such as voicemail, call waiting, and caller ID. 
Because these functions were most efficiently provided through the switch 
itself, they became known as “vertical switching services.” 
 Policymakers soon became concerned that the incumbent local 
telephone companies would be able to use their monopoly control over the 
local telephone network to favor their own proprietary enhanced and 
information service offerings. As a result, the FCC initiated its first and 
second Computer Inquiries,31 which required that any leading local 
telephone companies wishing to provide data processing or enhanced 
services do so through a separate corporate subsidiary and required that 
those companies serve all enhanced service providers on a 
nondiscriminatory basis.  
 The FCC later concluded in Computer Inquiry III,32 that the costs of 
the separate subsidiary requirement outweighed the benefits and that 
nonstructural safeguards could protect against anticompetitive activity just 
as effectively. Consequently, it allowed local telephone companies to avoid 
the separate subsidiary requirement so long as they adhered to a two-phase 
system of alternative regulatory requirements. The first phase was in 
essence a nondiscriminatory access mandate known as comparably 
efficient interconnection (CEI), which required local telephone providers to 
provide unaffiliated enhanced service providers with access to the same 
facilities on the same terms and conditions provided to their own 
proprietary enhanced and information service offerings.33 The second 
 
v. FCC, 693 F.2d 198 (D.C. Cir. 1982). The FCC later ruled that the term “enhanced 
services” should be interpreted as extending to the same functions as the term “information 
services” established by the MFJ and codified by the Telecommunications Act of 1996. 
Implementation of the Non-Accounting Safeguards of Secs. 271 & 272 of the Comm. Act of 
1934, as amended, First Report and Order and Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 11 
F.C.C.R. 21905, 21955-56 para. 102 (1996). See generally Daniel F. Spulber & Christopher 
S. Yoo, Access to Networks: Economic and Constitutional Connections, 88 CORNELL L. 
REV. 885, 1007 (2003). 
 31. Reg. & Policy Problems Presented by the Interdependence of Computer and Comm. 
Serv. & Facilities (Computer Inquiry I), Final Decision and Order, 28 F.C.C.2d 267, 270-74 
paras. 11-22 (1970), aff’d sub nom. GTE Serv. Corp. v. FCC, 474 F.2d 724 (2d Cir. 1973); 
Computer Inquiry II, supra note 30, at 475-86 paras. 233-60 (1980). 
 32. Amendment of Sections 64.702 of the Commission’s Rules and Regulations (Third 
Computer Inquiry), Report and Order, 104 F.C.C.2d 958, 1002-11 paras. 79-97, 1035-42 
paras. 147-66, 1064-66 paras. 214-17 (1986) [hereinafter Computer III Phase I Order], on 
reconsideration, 2 F.C.C.R. 3035 (1987), vacated and remanded sub nom. California v. 
FCC (California I), 905 F.2d 1217 (9th Cir. 1990).  
 33. Id. at 1021-25 paras. 117-35.  
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phase, known as open network architecture, in essence required unbundled 
access to all of the incumbent’s network elements.34 A series of judicial 
challenges prevented the alternative regime created by the Computer 
Inquiry III from ever being fully implemented.35  
 The consent decree ordering the breakup of AT&T also required the 
local telephone companies to provide equal access to all long-distance and 
information service providers.36 This regime was later extended to mandate 
equal access to CPE as well.37 These measures made no attempt to 
introduce competition into local telephony. Instead, they conceded that 
local telephone service remained a natural monopoly and instead attempted 
to foster competition in complementary services.38 
C. The Emergence of Competition in Local Telephony 
 Eventually, competition began to emerge, not just in services that 
were complementary to local telephony, but also with respect to local 
telephone service itself. The arrival of fiber optics fostered the emergence 
of a new type of company known as competitive access providers 
(CAPs).39 CAPs initially focused on offering long-distance bypass services, 
which allowed corporate customers to place long-distance telephone calls 
without having to access the Bell System’s local telephone facilities. The 
eventual expansion of CAP networks to cover the entire core business 
districts of major metropolitan areas made it possible for CAPs to begin to 
offer local telephone service in direct competition with the incumbents.40 
 CAP-provided services possessed certain advantages. CAPs employed 
fiber-optic technologies, which allowed them to offer more features and a 
 
 34. Id. at 1002-11 paras. 79-97, 1035-42 paras.147-66, 1064-66 paras. 214-17. 
 35. The Ninth Circuit initially overturned the Computer Inquiry III regime as arbitrary 
and capricious on the grounds that the FCC had not adequately justified its decision to rely 
on nonstructural safeguards. California I, 905 F.2d at 1230-39. A subsequent attempt to 
reinstate the Computer III regime also failed to pass judicial muster. Computer III Remand 
Proceedings: Bell Operating Co. Safeguards & Tier 1 Local Exch. Co. Safeguards, Report 
and Order, 6 F.C.C.R. 7571, 7578-88 paras. 14-41, 7617-25 paras. 98-109 (1991), vacated 
and remanded in part sub nom. California v. FCC, 39 F.3d 919 (9th Cir. 1994).  
 36. United States v. AT&T Co., 552 F. Supp. 131, 195-97 (D.D.C. 1982), aff’d mem. 
sub nom. Maryland v. United States, 460 U.S. 1001 (1983). 
 37. See HUBER, KELLOGG & THORNE, supra note 2, § 5.2.1.2. 
 38. See supra note 5 and accompanying text; Implementation of the Local Competition 
Provisions in the Telecomm. Act of 1996, Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 11 F.C.C.R. 
14171, para. 4 (1996). 
 39. The discussion that follows is adapted from Spulber & Yoo, Access to Networks, 
supra note 30, at 961-63. 
 40. David J. Teece, Telecommunications in Transition: Unbundling, Reintegration, and 
Competition, 1 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 47, 66, 78 (1994-1995) (describing CAP 
entry into local telephone service in New York, Chicago, and Grand Rapids). 
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cheaper price structure than the incumbents.41 Moreover, regulators did not 
require CAPs to submit tariffs. The more relaxed regulatory environment 
allowed CAPs to respond more quickly to changes in technology and 
market demand and to customize pricing and terms of service to each 
customer’s needs. The untariffed nature of CAP services also allowed them 
to evade the system of cross-subsidies embedded in current regulatory 
policy.  
 The emergence of competition in local telephone networks meant that 
some calls would originate on one local telephone company’s network and 
terminate on another’s. The FCC became concerned that incumbent local 
telephone companies would attempt to forestall the emergence of 
competition either by refusing to interconnect with CAPs or by only 
agreeing to do so on economically unattractive terms. The FCC thus 
ordered the incumbent local telephone companies to give CAPs the right to 
interconnect with their local telephone networks on the same terms and 
conditions that the incumbent provided for their own circuits. In order to 
make this interconnection mandate effective, the FCC gave CAPs the right 
to place any equipment needed to terminate calls in the incumbent’s central 
offices, which the FCC termed “physical collocation.” If the incumbent’s 
central office lacked sufficient physical space to accommodate the CAP, 
the FCC ordered the incumbent to provide “virtual collocation,” which 
allowed the CAP to interconnect with the incumbent’s network through a 
location outside of the incumbent’s central office. The price of both 
physical and virtual collocation would be governed by price caps. As with 
other price cap regimes, initial rates would be based on historical cost.42 
State authorities issued similar orders to facilitate CAP entry into local 
telephone service. 
 The FCC’s collocation rules were struck down on judicial review on 
the grounds that they exceeded the FCC’s statutory authority.43 The 
reviewing court reasoned that the right to place equipment on the 
incumbent’s property constituted precisely the type of permanent physical 
 
 41. Specifically, the use of fiber optics provided dramatic improvements in the amount 
of bandwidth available. It also decreased service costs in general and made them much less 
distance sensitive. Fiber optics also allowed CAPs to take advantage of the efficiencies 
made possible by computer processing, such as improved switching and digital 
compression.  
 42. Expanded Interconnection with Local Tel. Co. Facilities, Report and Order and 
Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 7 F.C.C.R. 7369, 7374-75 para. 7 & nn.10-12, 7389-90 
para. 39, 7390-91 paras. 41-42, 7392-94 paras. 44-46, 7424-25 para. 120, 7428-29 para. 
127, 7476-83 paras. 230-40 (1992) [hereinafter Special Access Order]; Expanded 
Interconnection with Local Tel. Co. Facilities, Second Report and Order and Third Notice 
of Proposed Rulemaking, 8 F.C.C.R. 7374, 7391-404 para. 29-31, 7418 para. 75, 7419 para. 
79, 7475 para. 144 (1993). 
 43. Bell Atl. Tel. Co. v. FCC, 24 F.3d 1441 (D.C. Cir. 1994). 
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occupation that Loretto44 held to be a per se taking. The principle that 
statutes should not be construed so as to create “‘an identifiable class of 
cases in which application of a statute will necessarily constitute a taking’” 
thus dictated that mandating physical collocation exceeded the FCC’s 
statutory authority.45 The FCC responded to this decision by giving the 
incumbent local telephone companies the option of providing virtual 
collocation instead of physical collocation. The FCC continued to maintain 
that mandatory physical collocation did not constitute a per se taking, but 
argued that, regardless of whether that was true, offering virtual collocation 
as an option eliminated any such constitutional problems.46 Before the 
courts could address the validity of these revised regulations, the entire 
scheme was rendered moot by the enactment of the Telecommunications 
Act of 1996.47  
D. The Telecommunications Act of 1996 
 The Telecommunications Act of 199648 was designed to “open[] all 
communications services to competition,” including local telephone 
service.49 Policymakers envisioned that competition in local telephone 
markets might emerge through one of three paths.50 First, an entrant might 
simply obtain access to all of the elements needed to provide local 
telephone service from the incumbent and resell them. Resale rates would 
be based on retail rates less “any marketing, billing, collection, and other 
costs that will be avoided” when local telephone services are provided by 
another carrier.51  
 Second, an entrant might build an entirely new network. Because any 
new entrant would need to be able to place calls to and receive calls from 
the incumbent local telephone companies’ customers, the 1996 Act requires 
that incumbents allow any requesting telecommunications carrier to 
 
 44. Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419 (1982). 
 45. Bell Atl. Tel. Co. 24 F.3d at 1445 (quoting United States v. Riverside Bayview 
Homes, Inc., 474 U.S. 121, 128 n.5 (1985)). 
 46. Expanded Interconnection with Local Tel. Co. Facilities, Memorandum Opinion 
and Order, 9 F.C.C.R. 5154, 5163 paras. 22-23 (1994). 
 47. See Pac. Bell Co. v. FCC, Nos. 94-1547, 94-1548 & 94-1612, 1996 WL 175198 
(D.C. Cir. Mar. 22, 1996). 
 48. Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104, § 601(b)(1), 110 Stat. 56, 
143 (1996) (codified as amended at 47 U.S.C. § 152 note (2000)). 
 49. H.R. REP. NO. 104-204, pt. 1, at 48-49, reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1, 11-13. 
The discussion that follows is adapted in part from Spulber & Yoo, Access to Networks, 
supra note 30, at 965-70. 
 50. Verizon Comm. Inc. v. FCC, 535 U.S. 467, 491-92 (2002). See also, 
Implementation of the Local Competition Provisions in the Telecomm. Act of 1996, First 
Report and Order, 11 F.C.C.R. 15499, 15509 para. 12 (1996) [hereinafter Local 
Competition Order].  
 51. 47 U.S.C. §252(d)(3) (2000). See also id. § 251(c)(4). 
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interconnect with their networks at any technically feasible point on terms 
that are equal in quality to those that the incumbent provides for its own 
circuits and that are “just, reasonable, and nondiscriminatory.”52  
 Third, an entrant may provide some of the elements needed to offer 
local telephone service and obtain the rest from the incumbent. To allow 
this to occur, Congress required every incumbent local telephone company 
to provide all other carriers with access to any of its network elements on 
an unbundled basis (called “unbundled network element” or “UNE” 
access). This would obviate the need for an entrant to have its entire 
network in place at the time it began to offer local service.53 Such access 
must be provided at any technically feasible point under rates, terms, and 
conditions that are “just, reasonable, and nondiscriminatory.”54 In 
determining which network elements would be subject to the unbundled 
access requirement, the statute required the FCC to consider whether 
“access to such network elements as are proprietary in nature is necessary” 
and whether “the failure to provide access to such network elements would 
impair the ability of the telecommunications carrier seeking access to 
provide the services that it seeks to offer.”55  
 The statute requires that the parties first attempt to determine the 
prices for interconnection and access to unbundled network elements 
through voluntary negotiations, at times aided by mediation by a state 
public utility commission. If voluntary negotiations fail, Congress gave 
state public utility commissions the power to set rates through binding 
arbitration, which would be governed by one of two statutory mandates. 
First, arbitrated rates for interconnection and UNE access shall be “based 
on the cost . . . of providing the interconnection or network element,” 
provided that cost is “determined without reference to a rate-of-return or 
other rate-based proceeding.”56 Second, access rates for terminating traffic 
originating on another network shall be governed by “reciprocal 
compensation,” which “provide[s] for the mutual and reciprocal recovery 
by each carrier of costs associated with the transport and termination on 
each carrier’s network facilities of calls that originate on the network 
facilities of the other carrier.”57 Such costs must be determined “on the 
basis of a reasonable approximation of the additional costs of terminating 
such calls,” although carriers may waive mutual recovery in favor of other 
 
 52. Id. § 251(c)(2)(B)-(D). 
 53. S. REP. NO. 104-230, at 147 (1996) (Conf. Rep.). 
 54. 47 U.S.C. § 251(c)(3). 
 55. Id. § 251(d)(2)(A)-(B) (emphasis added). 
 56. Id. § 252(d)(1)(A)(i). 
 57. Id. § 252(d)(2)(A)(i). 
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arrangements, such as bill and keep systems.58 The result was a wide-scale 
federalization of local telephony, including many areas of regulation that 
had previously fallen within the jurisdiction of the states.59 
 Because both interconnection and access to UNEs almost inevitably 
require allowing the requesting carrier to place some of its equipment on 
the incumbent local telephone company’s property, the statute requires 
incumbents to permit physical collocation so that entrants can establish 
physical connections between their equipment and the incumbent’s 
network. Specifically, the statute requires incumbents to permit “physical 
collocation of equipment necessary for interconnection or access to 
unbundled network elements” on “rates, terms, and conditions that are just, 
reasonable, and nondiscriminatory.”60 If “physical collocation is not 
practical for technical reasons or because of space limitations,” the statute 
gives incumbents the option of providing virtual collocation instead.61  
 As noted earlier, the FCC employed a methodology known as 
TELRIC to implement the provisions governing interconnection and UNE 
access rates. Under TELRIC, UNE rates are based on the element’s 
“economic costs,” which the FCC defined as the incremental costs directly 
attributable to the specified element plus a reasonable allocation of the joint 
and common costs.62 TELRIC resolved a longstanding dispute in 
regulatory policy63 by assessing both the incremental and common costs on 
a forward-looking basis that focuses on the cost of replacing a particular 
network element rather than the amount actually paid for it. TELRIC 
eludes the problems caused by the distinction between fixed and variable 
costs by measuring incremental costs from a “long run” perspective, which 
is defined as a period that is long enough for all of a firm’s costs to become 
variable or avoidable. The FCC believed that basing rates on forward-
looking incremental cost represented the best way to replicate, to the 
greatest extent possible, the conditions of a competitive market.64 In 
addition, TELRIC further accommodates technological change by requiring 
that costs be determined on the basis of the most efficient technology 
available and the lowest cost network configuration given the existing 
 
 58. Id. § 252(d)(2)(A)(ii). 
 59. As the Supreme Court noted in Iowa Utilities Board, “[T]he question in these cases 
is not whether the Federal Government has taken the regulation of local telecommunications 
competition away from the States. With regard to the matters addressed by the 1996 Act, it 
unquestionably has.” AT&T Corp. v. Iowa Utils. Bd., 525 U.S. 366, 378 n.6 (1999). 
 60. 47 U.S.C. § 251(c)(6). 
 61. Id. 
 62. Local Competition Order, supra note 50, 15845 para. 675, 15847 para. 682.  
 63. See Spulber & Yoo, Access to Networks, supra note 30, at 902-03, 908-10 
(describing the longstanding debate over whether regulated rates should be based on 
historical or replacement cost).  
 64. Local Competition Order, supra note 50, at 15813 para. 620, 15846 para. 679. 
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location of the incumbent’s current wire centers.65 The FCC declined to 
incorporate an element to reflect the opportunity cost borne by the network 
owner.66 Although the statutory mandate underlying TELRIC applied only 
to interconnection and UNE access, the FCC ruled that TELRIC should 
also govern physical collocation.67 In addition, the FCC determined that 
TELRIC represented the appropriate interpretation of the “the additional 
costs of terminating such calls” that govern reciprocal compensation, 
although the statute explicitly reserves the possibility of bill and keep.68  
 Initially, the FCC interpreted the “necessary” and “impair” 
requirements broadly to encompass essentially all of the elements needed 
to provide local telephone service.69 This allowed entrants to avoid resale 
pricing altogether simply by using UNE access to obtain access to the same 
network elements, a practice known as the UNE-Platform or UNE-P. Over 
time, the FCC began to cut back on the number of elements subject to the 
1996 Act’s UNE access requirements. The precipitous drop in the cost of 
switching caused by the advent of digital technologies led the FCC to 
rethink the extent to which switching should remain subject to UNE access. 
In 2003, the FCC removed switches serving large business customers 
(called “enterprise market switching”) from the list of elements to which 
new entrants could obtain UNE access.70 At the same time, it continued to 
allow UNE access to switches serving residences and small businesses 
(called “mass market switching”), not because of high fixed costs, but 
rather because of operational problems associated with “hot cuts,” during 
which the line serving a particular customer is disconnected from the 
 
 65. 47 C.F.R. § 51.505(b)(1) (2008). 
 66. Local Competition Order, supra note 50, at 15859-60 paras. 708-11. 
 67. Id. at 15816 para. 629.  
 68. Id. at 16023 para. 1054 (quoting 47 U.S.C. § 252(d)(2)(A)(ii)); accord 47 C.F.R. § 
51.705(a)(1) (2008) (requiring that reciprocal compensation be determined on the basis of 
forward-looking economic costs pursuant to the methodology governing pricing for 
interconnection and access for unbundled network elements). The FCC allowed for three 
alternatives. One option was for state PUCs to adopt a proxy range set by the FCC (at 0.2 
and 0.4 cents per minute for termination). Id. at 16024 para. 1055, 16026-28 para. 1060-62. 
The Eighth Circuit struck down the use of proxy prices. See Iowa Utils. Bd. v. FCC, 219 
F.3d 744, 756-57 (8th Cir. 2000), rev’d on other grounds sub nom. Verizon Comm. Inc. v. 
FCC, 535 U.S. 467 (2002). This portion of the Eighth Circuit’s decision does not appear to 
have been challenged before the Supreme Court. 
 69. See Local Competition Order, supra note 50, at 15683-714 paras. 360-426; 15714-
69 paras. 428-528; Implementation of the Local Competition Provisions of the Telecomm. 
Act of 1996, Third Report and Order, 15 F.C.C.R. 3696, 3778-832 paras. 181-299, 3840-90 
paras. 318-437 (1999) [hereinafter UNE Remand Order]. 
 70. See Review of the Sec. 251 Unbundled Obligations of Incumbent Local Exch. 
Carriers, Report and Order and Order on Remand and Further Notice of Proposed 
Rulemaking, 18 F.C.C.R. 16978, 17237 para. 419, 17238-39 para. 421, 17258-60, paras. 
451-53 (2003) [hereinafter Triennial Review Order], modified, 18 F.C.C.R. 19020 (2003), 
vacated in part sub nom. U.S. Telecom Ass’n v. FCC, 359 F.3d 554 (D.C. Cir. 2004). 
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incumbent’s switch and reattached to the new entrant’s.71 Both findings 
could be rebutted on a case-by-case basis.72 
 The D.C. Circuit upheld the FCC’s decision with respect to enterprise 
market switching, observing that “[t]here appears to be no suggestion that 
mass market switches exhibit declining average costs in the relevant 
markets, or even that switches entail large sunk costs” and deployment of 
duplicate switches did not appear to be either “uneconomic” or 
“wasteful.”73 The absence of any evidence that denying access to 
incumbents’ mass market switches would impair competitors’ ability to 
compete led the court to overturn the FCC’s refusal to deregulate mass 
market switching.74 On remand, the FCC harmonized both findings by 
ruling that mass market switching was no longer subject to UNE access 
requirements, largely because of the wide-scale deployment of competitive 
circuit switches and the investment disincentives created by sharing 
requirements, a conclusion that was upheld on judicial review.75 
III. THE RATIONALES FOR REGULATING LOCAL TELEPHONE 
NETWORKS 
 The regulation of local telephone networks has traditionally been 
based on four primary rationales: the belief that local telephone service is a 
natural monopoly, the concern that network economic effects will give 
incumbents decisive advantages, the dangers that the incumbent will 
engage in vertical exclusion to deny access to providers of complementary 
services, and the purported dangers of “ruinous” competition. The impact 
of these regulatory efforts—and the challenges that state and federal 
regulators have confronted—illustrate the difficulty of attempting to 
impose regulation on such a technologically complex and dynamic 
industry, as well as how the emergence of competition is undermining each 
of these rationales. 
 
 71. Id. at 17237-38 para. 419, 17239 para. 422, 17263-64 para. 459, 17265-86  paras. 
464-485. 
 72. Id. at 17237 para. 419, 17238-39 para. 421, 17239-40 para. 424, 17260-63 paras. 
454-58, 17264-65 paras. 460-463, 17290-312 paras. 493-524. 
 73. U.S. Telecom Ass’n, 359 F.3d at 569, 572-73. 
 74. Id. at 586-87. 
 75. See Unbundled Access to Network Elements, Order on Remand, 20 F.C.C.R. 2533, 
2641-61 paras. 199-228 (2005) [hereinafter Triennial Review Remand Order], pet. for 
review denied sub nom. Covad Comm. Co. v. FCC, 450 F.3d 528, 546-49 (D.C. Cir. 2006). 
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A. Natural Monopoly 
 One of the bedrock assumptions of telecommunications policy is that 
local telephone networks are natural monopolies.76 A natural monopoly 
exists when a market is subadditive; this occurs when one firm can serve 
the entire market demand at a lower cost than could two or more firms. A 
sufficient condition for subadditivity exists if the scale economies are so 
large that the average cost curve declines over the entire industry output. 
One example occurs when the production technology requires the incurring 
of large, up-front fixed costs. The fact that average cost is always declining 
permits producers with larger volumes to underprice their competitors, 
which in turn allows them to capture a still larger share of the market. The 
growing disparity in sales volume causes the price disparity to widen still 
further until all other producers are driven from the market. When that is 
the case, even markets that begin as competitive will eventually come to be 
dominated by a single player. 
 The large fixed cost investments associated with establishing 
telephone switches and the network of wires needed to transmit telephone 
calls has led many observers to regard local telephone networks as natural 
monopolies. Natural monopoly represented one of the central justifications 
for early regulatory efforts in the 1920s77 as well as the regulatory scheme 
created by the Communications Act of 1934.78 Even after the FCC began to 
use regulation and the breakup of AT&T to promote competition in 
services complementary to local telephony, such as CPE, long distance, and 
information services, policymakers continued to believe that local 
telephone networks remained natural monopolies—largely by virtue of the 
high fixed costs associated with laying the wires needed to make local 
distribution possible.79 It was not until the enactment of the 
Telecommunications Act of 1996 that policymakers began attempting to 
promote local competition in earnest. 
 A close analysis of the cost structure associated with the early 
telephone industry undercuts claims that local telephone service constituted 
a natural monopoly during that time. The primary source of diseconomies 
 
 76. The following discussion of the economics of natural monopoly draws on Spulber 
& Yoo, Access to Networks, supra note 30, at 917; and Daniel F. Spulber, Deregulating 
Telecommunications, 12 YALE J. ON REG. 25, 31-32 (1995). 
 77. S. REP. NO. 67-75, at 1 (1921). 
 78. STUDY OF COMMUNICATIONS BY AN INTERDEPARTMENTAL COMMITTEE, 73d Cong., 
2d Sess. 11-2 (Comm. Print 1934), reprinted in A LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE 
COMMUNICATIONS ACT OF 1934, supra note 17, at 101, 115-16; Hearings on S. 2910 Before 
the Senate Comm. on Interstate Commerce, 73d Cong. 100 (1934), reprinted in A 
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE COMMUNICATIONS ACT OF 1934, supra note 17, at 119, 222. 
 79. See supra note 5 and accompanying text. 
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of scale was switching.80 Initially, telephone connections were made 
manually by an operator at a switchboard. Switching was relatively simple 
so long as the number of subscribers connected to any particular exchange 
was relatively small. Increases in the number of subscribers eventually 
required the installation of additional switchboards interconnected through 
trunk lines, which in turn caused switching to become more complex. For 
example, in an exchange with two switchboards, one-half of all calls would 
arrive on one switchboard and terminate on the other, which would require 
the participation of two operators to set up and take down each call. Calls 
to exchanges with three and four switchboards would require multiple 
operators for two-thirds and three-quarters of all calls respectively. In 
addition, the presence of multiple switchboards increased the 
organizational problem considerably. Operators had to keep track of the 
board on which each customer resided and of which trunk lines were open 
at any particular time. The problem becomes all the more difficult after one 
considers that the number of connections increases quadratically with the 
number of users.81 Thus, increases in the subscriber base drastically 
increase both the cost of service and the complexity of the organizational 
problem. 
 The diseconomies of scale in switching became a major problem for 
the Bell System, which had to seek rate increases as its subscriber base 
grew. It also became a trap for the independents, which often entered based 
on the promise of lower rates, only to find that their very success in 
attracting business away from the Bell System rendered those rates 
unsustainable.82 The nonscalability of switching technology thus undercuts 
claims that the telephone system was a natural monopoly during the 
industry’s early years. Although the deployment of mechanical switches 
eventually caused switching to become less important as a source of 
diseconomies of scale, the Bell System did not begin wide-scale 
deployment of mechanical switches until 1919.83  
 
 80. For an excellent discussion of the diseconomies of scale in switching, see Milton 
Mueller, The Switchboard Problem: Scale, Signaling, and Organization in Manual 
Telephone Swathing, 1877-1897, 30 TECH. & CULTURE 534 (1989). 
 81. Spulber & Yoo, Graph Theory Approach, supra note 9, at 1696; Christopher S. 
Yoo, Network Neutrality and the Economics of Congestion, 94 GEO. L.J. 1847, 1883-84 
(2006). 
 82. MILTON L. MUELLER, JR., UNIVERSAL SERVICE 36, 65-66 (1997); David F, Weiman 
& Richard C. Levin, Preying for Monopoly? The Case of Southern Bell Telephone 
Company, 1894-1912, 102 J. POL. ECON. 103, 104 (1994). 
 83. See generally H.R. Doc. No. 76-340, at 261 (1939); BELL TELEPHONE 
LABORATORIES, A HISTORY OF ENGINEERING AND SCIENCE IN THE BELL SYSTEM: THE EARLY 
YEARS (1875-1925) 552-53, 611-12 (1975); ROBERT J. CHAPUIS, 100 YEARS OF TELEPHONE 
SWITCHING (1878-1978), PART I: MANUAL AND ELECTROMECHANICAL SWITCHING (1878-
1960S), 249 (1982); Joan Nix & David Gabel, The Introduction of Automatic Switching into 
the Bell System: Market Versus Institutional Influences, 30 J. ECON. ISSUES 737, 738 (1996). 
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 Disputes over the extent to which the local telephone network 
constituted a natural monopoly persisted well into more recent times. 
Leading treatises on regulated industries acknowledge the persistence of 
disputes over whether the telephone industry was characterized by 
increasing or decreasing average costs.84 A vibrant empirical literature 
emerged debating whether local telephone networks were natural 
monopolies. Some studies concluded that local telephone service was 
subadditive,85 while other studies drew the opposite conclusion.86 
 Subsequent technological developments have largely rendered these 
disputes moot. As noted earlier, the advent of digital technologies has 
caused a precipitous drop in the cost of switching, which in turn has led the 
FCC to remove switching from the list of elements subject to UNE 
access.87 Competition has even begun to emerge with respect to the local 
loop, the portion of the local telephone network thought most likely to 
retain natural monopoly characteristics. State public utility commissions 
have begun to deregulate local service to large business customers,88 
although the FCC continues to subject high capacity loops (except for dark 
fiber) to UNE access obligations.89 Wireless has also emerged as a vibrant 
competitor in local telephone service in the residential and small business 
markets, with the number of wireless subscribers surpassing the number of 
wireline subscribers since 200490 and with thirty million American adults 
 
 84. See, e.g., JAMES C. BONBRIGHT, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC UTILITY RATES 16-17 (1961). 
 85. See A. Charnes, W.W. Cooper & T. Sueyoshi, A Goal Programming/Constrained 
Regression Review of the Bell System Breakup, 34 MGMT. SCI. 1 (1988); Lars-Hendrik 
Röller, Proper Quadratic Cost Functions with an Application to the Bell System, 72 REV. 
ECON. & STAT. 202 (1990); Lars-Hendrik Röller, Modeling Cost Structure: The Bell System 
Revisited, 22 APPLIED ECON. 1161 (1990); Wesley W. Wilson & Yimin Zhou, 
Telecommunications Deregulation and Subadditive Costs: Are Local Telephone Monopolies 
Natural?, 19 INT’L J. INDUS. ORG. 909 (2001).  See also David Gabel & D. Mark Kennet, 
Economies of Scope in the Local Telephone Exchange Market, 6 J. REG. ECON. 381 (1994); 
F. Gasmi, J.J. Laffont & W.W. Sharkey, The Natural Monopoly Test Reconsidered: An 
Engineering Process-Based Approach to Empirical Analysis in Telecommunications, 20 
INT’L J. INDUS. ORG. 435 (2002). 
 86. See David S. Evans & James J. Heckman, Multiproduct Cost Function Estimates 
and Natural Monopoly Tests for the Bell System, in BREAKING UP BELL 127 (David S. Evans 
ed., 1983); David S. Evans & James J. Heckman, A Test for Subadditivity of the Cost 
Function with an Application to the Bell System, 74 AM. ECON. REV. 615 (1984); Richard T. 
Shin & John S. Ying, Unnatural Monopolies in Local Telephone, 23 RAND J. ECON. 171 
(1992); Sanford V. Berg & John Tschirhart, A Market Test for Natural Monopoly in the 
Local Exchange, 8 J. REG. ECON. 103 (1995).  
 87. See supra note 72 and accompanying text. 
 88. See Timothy J. Tardiff, Changes in Industry Structure and Technological 
Convergence: Implications for Competition Policy and Regulation in Telecommunications, 
4 INT’L ECON. & ECON. POL’Y 109 (2007). 
 89. See Triennial Review Remand Order, supra note 70, at 2614-41 paras. 146-98. 
 90. FCC INDUSTRY ANALYSIS TECHNOLOGY DIVISION, WIRELINE COMPETITION BUREAU, 
LOCAL TELEPHONE COMPETITION: STATUS AS OF DECEMBER 31, 2004, at 1, 3, 5 tbl.1, 17 
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(roughly fourteen percent) relying solely on their wireless phone for 
service.91 Competition from Voice-over-Internet Protocol (VoIP) provided 
via coaxial cable is starting to emerge with respect to residential and small 
business customers as well. Although state and federal regulators have 
exhibited some reluctance to deregulate local telephone service on the basis 
of intermodal competition,92 it seems only a matter of time before one can 
plausibly continue to maintain that the local loop still exhibits natural 
monopoly characteristics. 
B. Network Economic Effects 
 Policymakers have also invoked network economic effects as a 
justification for wide-scale regulation of local telephone service. Network 
economic effects exist when the value of a particular good is determined in 
large part by the number of other people connected to the same network.93 
The concern is that network economic effects will create demand-side 
economies of scale that will cause the largest networks to be worth the 
most to consumers. In this way, network economic effects can create what 
is sometimes called “excess inertia” that allows incumbents to maintain 
their dominance long after the arrival of a more efficient competitor or 
technology.94 
 The leaders of the Bell System clearly understood the importance of 
network economic effects. As it noted in its 1908 Annual Report, “[a] 
telephone—without a connection at the other end of the line—is . . . one of 
the most useless things in the world. Its value depends on the connection 
with the other telephone—and increases with the number of 
connections.”95 Indeed, the Bell System attempted to use network 
economic effects to leverage its initial dominance by refusing to 
interconnect with independent telephone systems during the early years of 
competition. Some scholars have suggested network economic effects 
played a key role in the Bell System’s return to dominance after 1907, 
 
tbl.13 (July 2005), available at http://www.fcc.gov/Bureaus/Common_Carrier/Reports/ 
FCC-State_Link/IAD/lcom0705.pdf  
 91. Alex Mindlin, Cellphone-Only Homes Hit a Milestone, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 27, 2007, 
at C3. 
 92. See, e.g., Triennial Review Order, supra note 70, at 17252 para. 445; Application of 
Qwest Corp. for Deregulation of Basic Local Exch. Rates, Order No. 29360, 2003 WL 
22417269 (Idaho Pub. Utils. Comm’n Oct. 20, 2003). 
 93. For more complete analyses of network economic effects, see Christopher S. Yoo, 
Vertical Integration and Media Regulation in the New Economy, 19 YALE J. ON REG. 171, 
269-85 (2002); Spulber & Yoo, Access to Networks, supra note 30, at 921-33. 
 94. Joseph Farrell & Garth Saloner, Installed Base and Compatibility: Innovation, 
Product Preannouncements, and Predation, 76 AM. ECON. REV. 940, 942 (1986). 
 95. AT&T, 1908 ANNUAL REPORT 21 (1909); see also BONBRIGHT, supra note 84, at 17. 
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when its market share dipped below fifty percent.96 Some argue that the 
Bell System reasserted its dominant position by refusing to interconnect 
with the independents’ local telephone networks. According to this 
argument, the network economic effects from connecting with other local 
customers created demand-side scale economies that gave Bell a decisive 
advantage.97 Others focus on the network economic effects provided by 
Bell System’s refusal to allow the independents to interconnect with its 
long-distance network. Under this argument, key long-distance patents, 
such as the Pupin coil, enabled the Bell System to provide superior long-
distance service, which in turn increased the value of the network by 
increasing the number of customers any subscriber could reach through the 
network. These network economic effects, according to this variant of the 
argument, gave the Bell System a decisive competitive advantage which it 
could use to drive out the independents simply by refusing to allow them to 
interconnect with its long 98
 A close analysis of the history of the era reveals that the refusal to 
interconnect likely did not play a substantial role in allowing the Bell 
System to reassert its dominance. The Bell System’s long-distance network 
was unlikely to serve as a source of demand-side economies of scale. 
During this period, long distance represented only a tiny fraction of the 
overall demand for telephone service.99 Indeed, contemporary observers 
acknowledged that its ability to provide superior long-haul, long-distance 
service was “of little commercial or social importance.”100 Short-haul long-
distance service could be provided simply by interconnecting adjacent 
exchanges. Again, the Bell System held no competitive advantage for this 
type of traffic, because AT&T and the independents were employing the 
same technology.101 Assuming that long distance was an important source 
of network economic effects, as noted earlier, the independent telephone 
companies had captured more than half of the market by 1907. They were 
 
 96. See KENNETH LIPARTITO, THE BELL SYSTEM AND REGIONAL BUSINESS: THE 
TELEPHONE IN THE SOUTH, 1877-1920, at 250 n.4 (1989) (“The notion that Bell’s refusal to 
interconnect was a potent competitive weapon is an article of faith in telephone literature.”). 
 97. See Mark A. Lemley, Antitrust and the Internet Standardization Problem, 28 CONN. 
L. REV. 1041, 1046 n.19 (1996); Howard A. Shelanski & J. Gregory Sidak, Antitrust 
Divestiture in Network Industries, 68 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 8 (2001). 
 98. JOHN BROOKS, TELEPHONE: THE FIRST HUNDRED YEARS 114 (1975); GERALD W. 
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thus in a position to neutralize any attempt by the Bell System to use 
network economic effects to leverage its market size simply by banding 
together to form a network equal in size to AT&T’s.102 
 The Bell System’s local telephone networks were also unlikely to 
have served as the source of significant network economic effects. As we 
noted in our previous work, network economic effects are unlikely to be a 
source of anticompetitive problems in markets undergoing rapid growth, 
because the presence of a large number of uncommitted customers would 
offset whatever advantages the incumbent enjoyed by virtue of its existing 
customer base.103 A new entrant could achieve a network of the same or 
greater size than that of the incumbent simply by pursuing new customers. 
 This appears to be precisely what happened in the early telephone 
industry. The Bell System had patterned its initial business strategy on 
Western Union’s, which primarily provided long-distance communications 
to business customers located in large commercial centers. As a result, the 
Bell System largely ignored small cities, rural areas, and residential areas, 
not even making much of an effort to connect larger cities to their suburbs. 
The skeletal nature of the Bell System’s network left substantial areas of 
the country in which new, independent telephone companies could enter 
without facing any opposition. The independents were thus free to pursue 
the large number of unserved customers who had no allegiance to the Bell 
System. Indeed, once the independents had established themselves in these 
unserved areas, they were the ones who benefited from network economic 
effects, not the Bell System.104 
 The traditional account is also belied by the business strategy pursued 
by the independents. If AT&T were in a dominant position, one would 
expect the independents to be clamoring to interconnect with it. In fact, the 
independents did not want to interconnect with AT&T any more than 
AT&T wanted to interconnect with the independents. Indeed, it was only 
after the Bell System changed policy and liberalized its interconnection 
policies that it began to reassert its dominance.105 
 The early telephone industry thus most closely resembles the type of 
competition, identified in the theoretical literature in which two equally 
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sized players refuse to interconnect and instead engage in a race for the 
market in which “[t]he successful competitor strives to become the 
surviving monopolist.”106 Interestingly though, this type of competition 
does not lead to the delays in technology adoption and supracompetitive 
returns associated with refusals to interconnect by dominant firms. It also 
has the virtue of promoting the rapid build-out of new network 
technologies.107 
 Spurred into a race for the market, both the Bell System and the 
independents began investing heavily in expanding their networks. Annual 
growth rates, which had been languishing at around six percent during the 
monopoly period, skyrocketed to over twenty percent during the 
competitive era.108 By 1907, the independent telephone industry had 
achieved parity with the Bell System109 and competing with Bell in fifty-
nine percent of cities with populations over 5,000.110 At this point, the 
independents could defeat whatever advantage AT&T might have gained 
by its refusal to interconnect simply by banding together to form a network 
of equal size.111  
 It is thus unlikely that network economic effects played a significant 
role in allowing the Bell System to reassert its dominance during the early 
twentieth century. The emergence of local telephone competition has 
rendered them even more inapposite today. Scholars from a wide range of 
perspectives generally recognize that the anticompetitive effects associated 
with network economic effects can only arise if the market is dominated by 
a single, large player. When that is not the case, competition already 
provides powerful incentives for networks to interconnect, and in the 
absence of a dominant player, any one firm’s refusal to interconnect is 
unlikely to harm competition. On the contrary, network economic effects 
provide powerful incentives to interconnect because any firm refusing to do 
so risks being left out in the cold.112 The FCC embraced this reasoning 
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when declining to require wireless telephone networks to interconnect with 
one another, concluding that the growth of competition obviated the need 
for any regulatory intervention.113 Thus the technological changes that have 
allowed competition in local telephone service to emerge have effectively 
undercut incumbents’ ability to use network economic effects to harm 
competition. 
C. Vertical Exclusion 
 Although the entire telephone system was initially regarded as a 
monopoly, the emergence of potential competition in portions of the 
network raised the possibility that the Bell System would use its control 
over the portions of the network that remained a natural monopoly to harm 
competition in those portions of the network where competition was now 
possible. Specifically, policymakers became concerned that the Bell 
System would use its control over the local telephone network to harm 
competition in complementary services.  
 Vertical exclusion was thus the central concern underlying the Part 68 
rules mandating that the Bell System open its local telephone networks to 
CPE manufactured by other companies.114 The same concern motivated the 
requirement that the Bell System open its local telephone networks to 
competing long-distance companies.115 It also underlay the Computer 
Inquiries requirement of structural separation and equal access to 
unaffiliated information service providers.116 Each of these decisions were 
reinforced by the consent decree settling the government’s case against 
AT&T, which similarly mandated structural separation and equal access for 
long-distance and information service providers.117 All of these restrictions 
were eventually incorporated into the Telecommunications Act of 1996,118 
which prohibited the local telephone companies formerly affiliated with the 
Bell System, known as Bell Operating Companies (BOCs), from providing 
long-distance services, manufacturing equipment, or engaging in two 
designated information services (specifically, electronic publishing and 
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alarm monitoring) in their home regions. The 1996 Act permitted the BOCs 
to offer other information services immediately and to offer electronic 
publishing so long as they did so through a separate affiliate.119  
 Concerns about vertical exclusion depend on the assumption that local 
telephone service remains monopolized, because without market power in 
one market, the firm attempting to engage in vertical exclusion would have 
nothing to use as leverage.120 The sunset provisions of the 1996 Act reveal 
the expectation that concerns about vertical exclusion would ultimately be 
dissipated by the emergence of competition in local telephone service. By 
their own terms, the statutory restrictions on information services expired 
in 2000 and 2001.121 The 1996 Act also eliminated the prohibition against 
providing long-distance service and manufacturing equipment for BOCs 
either facing facilities-based competition or satisfying a fourteen-point 
competitive checklist establishing that they are providing 
nondiscriminatory access to their local telephone networks, although the 
BOCs seeking to offer those services had to do so through a separate 
affiliate for an additional three years.122 The FCC has ruled that sufficient 
progress has been made in every state except Alaska and Hawaii to justify 
permitting BOCs to begin offering long-distance service.123 With the 
increasing competitive pressure being brought by wireless carriers and 
broadband providers offering VoIP, it appears to be just a matter of time 
before vertical exclusion by local telephone companies ceases to be a 
regulatory concern. 
 In addition, certain services depend on a degree of vertical integration 
that structural separation and equal access requirements render impossible. 
Two persistent problems raised by the Computer Inquiries illustrate this 
fact.124 The advent of digital switching placed computing power in the 
switch itself, which was capable of supporting a vast new array of vertical 
switching services, such as voice mail, call waiting, call forwarding, and 
advance calling. Although such services could be offered by independent 
providers, they appeared to function most efficiently when their capabilities 
were designed directly into the telephone switch. Allowing local telephone 
companies to offer these services on an integrated basis, however, was 
inconsistent with the regime of interoperability and transparency implicit in 
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equal access and structural separation and needed an express regulatory 
waiver before they could be provided in this manner.125 Estimates of the 
cost of the delay in the introduction of such services caused by regulations 
to protect against vertical exclusion exceed $1 billion per year.126 
 Another classic example of the problems associated with attempts to 
regulate vertical exclusion is the emergence of digital transmission, during 
which local telephone companies began moving away from routing traffic 
on a synchronous circuit-switched basis and began to employ asynchronous 
packet-switched protocols in portions of their networks. The shift to digital 
transmission technologies required the network to engage in protocol 
conversion at different points that again was inconsistent with the regime of 
interoperability and transparency implicit in equal access and structural 
separation. After considerable regulatory wrangling, the FCC concluded 
that the costs of the regulations exceeded their benefits and permitted 
protocol conversion, notwithstanding its inconsistency with the 
commitment to vertical disintegration embodied in Computer Inquiry II.127 
 These examples illustrate some of the efficiency losses associated 
with attempting to regulate vertical exclusion in telecommunications. 
Technological developments can cause interfaces that were once natural 
points of separation between companies to shift or collapse. These costs 
render all the more attractive the regulatory alternative of eliminating the 
problems of vertical exclusion by promoting facilities-based competition 
rather than by attempting to mandate structural separation and equal access. 
D. Ruinous/Managed Competition 
 Firms competing in industries characterized by high fixed costs have 
long raised the specter that the market will devolve into a form of ruinous 
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competition in which no firm can operate profitably.128 Ruinous 
competition hypothesizes that once firms have sunk the fixed costs needed 
to enter, they will not exit so long as they can charge prices that cover their 
marginal costs. The resulting competition drives prices down to marginal 
cost, which in turn prevents firms from generating sufficient revenue to 
recover their fixed costs. To the extent that a market is a natural monopoly, 
entry by a second firm wastes resources because only one competitor will 
ultimately emerge, which necessarily means that any investment in laying a 
second set of wires will ultimately prove fruitless. Some sort of coordinated 
action, either through collusion or government regulation, was viewed as 
the only viable solution to endemic overproduction and eventual collapse 
into a natural monopoly.129 
 The Bell System raised the classic argument that entry by the 
independents had caused the industry to engage in ruinous competition. For 
example, in AT&T’s Annual Reports, company president Fredrick P. Fish 
repeatedly complained that competition had driven rates too low to allow it 
to recover its fixed costs.130 Theodore N. Vail picked up this refrain after 
he assumed the presidency of AT&T in 1907, complaining that 
“[d]uplication of plant is a waste to the investor” and that “[d]uplication of 
charges is a waste to the user.”131 Competition simply meant “the public 
must pay double rates for service, to meet double charges, on double 
capital, double operating expenses and double maintenance.”132 Concerns 
about the costs to consumers from wasteful duplication also appeared in the 
report of the Study that laid the foundation for the Communications Act of 
1934.133 The avoidance of wasteful duplication was reflected in the fact 
that the order breaking up AT&T made no attempt to promote competition 
in local telephone service134 as well as the presumption inherent in the 1996 
Act’s UNE access provisions that some facilities needed to offer local 
telephone service would not be dupl 135
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 Ruinous competition has been heavily criticized as a basis for 
governmental intervention. The excess capacity caused by multiple firms’ 
decisions to incur fixed costs simply causes incumbent firms to forego 
making any further capital investments until the market returns to long-run 
equilibrium. Although firms may suffer substantial losses in the short run, 
the ensuing competition would yield substantial welfare benefits to 
consumers in the form of lower prices, while simultaneously identifying the 
most efficient firm and providing for an empirical test of whether a 
particular market was in fact a natural monopoly. The only justification for 
intervention would be to protect the investors in these companies, which 
would violate the standard admonition that regulators should protect 
competition, not competitors. It is for this reason that then-Harvard law 
professor and now-Justice Stephen Breyer dismissed the rationale as an 
“empty box” with no particular economic meaning or content.136 These 
criticisms have been echoed both by economists137 and by the Supreme 
Court.138  
 These criticisms apply to the arguments advanced by AT&T. The 
duplication of costs, about which Vail complained, is an inevitable part of 
the market-based economy. As Richard Gabel noted in his landmark study 
of the early telephone industry, “[a]ll competition involves some 
redundancy of plant facilities and work effort. The question is whether the 
pressure of competing market forces produces a better or cheaper product 
than a single supply service.”139 As the independent telephone industry 
pointed out at the time, “‘[w]hat forces the business man to take two 
telephones? The same thing that forces him to advertise his goods in two 
newspapers in a town instead of one—to reach the people.’”140 A 
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newspaper monopoly would obviate the need for placing advertisements in 
multiple newspapers, but at the cost of lower circulation and higher prices. 
 The evidence suggests that, on balance, competition provided 
significant benefits to consumers. Subscribers who purchased service from 
both the Bell System and the independent were able to obtain access to five 
to ten times the number of subscribers for a total price that was roughly the 
same or less than that paid during the monopoly period.141 At the same 
time, the benefits from eliminating competition in favor of unified service 
provided through a single telephone network were attenuated by the fact 
that most telephone subscribers only sought to communicate with a 
relatively small group of other people. Indeed, as we have explained in 
detail elsewhere, heterogeneity of consumer preferences can render 
equilibrium with multiple incompatible systems optimal.142 Most 
customers needed only to purchase one service, as groups tended to 
segregate themselves into discrete user communities clustered on one 
phone system or the other. As a result, the benefits of unifying these 
systems would be minimal, and even those benefits could be easily realized 
by using public pay phones or the free phone service provided by bars and 
other local merchants.143 Thus, the elimination of competition provided few 
benefits to co
 Instead, the Bell System’s arguments are better understood as part of 
what Gabel has described as a deliberate “flight from competition.”144 By 
1907, the corporate leadership of the Bell System acknowledged that its 
initial strategy of trying to expand its network, cut rates, and refuse to 
interconnect with the independents was a colossal failure. The price cuts 
had a devastating effect on the Bell System’s profitability, with revenue 
dropping from $88 per subscriber in 1905 to $43 per subscriber in 1907.145 
Establishing local telephone service in the areas it did not yet serve 
required enormous amounts of capital, which the Bell System struggled to 
raise. Committed as it was to a business strategy centered on long-distance 
service, service provided by the Bell System required higher quality 
equipment, which in turn made its local telephone networks more costly 
than the independents’. In contrast, the independent companies were able to 
construct systems at lower costs, financed largely by local sources of 
capital raised by local residents who were able to leverage preexisting 
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government intervention and instead to endorse direct regulation of 
telephone rates.152  
 The primary beneficiary of unified service and the concomitant 
elimination of price competition would not be consumers, but rather the 
shareholders of the Bell System. Unification of local telephone service also 
benefited those classes of business that depended on the ability to contact 
regional and national business centers, such as banks, railroads, hotels, and 
wholesale suppliers, and thus were the only customers who felt compelled 
to purchase service from both the Bell System and the independents. 
Unified service provided few benefits to small businesses and residences, 
which placed a substantially lower value on the ability to contact a broader 
range of people.153 For example, in the case of Norfolk, Virginia, the Bell 
System’s acquisition of the independent allowed the 700 business 
customers who purchased both services to reduce their monthly charges by 
twenty-five percent.154 The 2,100 business customers who previously only 
purchased one service would pay higher rates, an increase of twenty 
percent for customers served by Bell prior to the merger and an increase of 
one hundred percent for customers previously served by the independent.155  
 It was the business users that subscribed to both systems that provided 
the key political support for the government’s eventual acquiescence in the 
return of monopoly. After some initial resistance, the independents decided 
to cooperate with the Bell System’s efforts. Having already built out much 
of the unserved areas of the country, the independents had faced a 
transition to the far more demanding strategy of pursuing more intensive 
development of established markets. Bell mergers with selected 
independents also fragmented their ability to provide short-haul long-
distance service by directly interconnecting adjacent exchanges, until the 
Bell System’s so-called Vail Commitment of 1912, which promised to 
leave unchanged the independent toll-line connections already established 
by any acquired company. The independents’ efforts to establish their own 
long-haul long-distance network were hampered by the fact that they were 
not a unified enterprise, which made coordination difficult and left them 
vulnerable to divide-and-conquer strategies, in addition to the Morgan 
banking interests’ ability to persuade key players to withdraw their 
financial support for the independents’ efforts to establish their own long-
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distance network. Faced with dim prospects, the independents realized that 
merger with the Bell System was their best option.156 
 This change in strategy reversed the downward trend in the Bell 
System’s market share. The number of noncompeting independent 
telephone systems that had accepted the Bell System’s offer of 
accommodation jumped from twenty-five percent to seventy-nine percent 
between 1907 and 1909, and rose to eighty-nine percent by 1913.157 The 
number of cities with a population over 5,000 in which competition existed 
plummeted from fifty-nine percent in 1907 to thirty-seven percent in 
1913.158 By 1934, the Bell System’s market share had once again reached 
eighty percent.159 With a few exceptions, the independent companies that 
remained, for the most part, served discrete areas in which the Bell System 
did not operate.  
 Thus, monopoly was not the justification for regulation. Regulation 
was instead the justification for monopoly. Regulation, moreover, proved 
ineffective at curbing rates. Consider state regulation of intrastate rates. 
Debates over the proper method for determining the rate base prevented 
state regulatory authorities from developing a coherent basis for setting 
rates. The complexity of the corporate structure, in which the parent 
company owned the operating companies and rented telephone equipment 
to them through Western Electric, made it difficult for individual state 
authorities to discern each operating company’s actual financial results, let 
alone regulate their profits. The regulatory challenge was made all the more 
difficult by the fact that state commissions were almost completely 
dependent on the Bell System for the information they needed and that the 
parent company was regulated at the federal level, while the operating 
companies were regulated at the state level and Western Electric was not 
regulated at all.160 Thus, even histories of the early telephone industry that 
are largely sympathetic to the Bell System understood that “regulation, 
coming late and still almost non-existent in several of the States, has had 
relatively little effect in influencing the growth and financial success of the 
Bell telephone system.”161 
 Federal regulation of interstate rates was similarly unsuccessful. In 
the words of Gerald Brock, “[t]he early FCC was an ideal regulatory 
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agency from AT&T’s perspective. It provided very little control or 
restriction on AT&T’s interstate rates and activities but it did help prevent 
competition from arising.”162 For the first three decades following the 
enactment of the 1934 Act, the FCC failed to undertake any formal 
investigations or to create any systematic basis for evaluating the 
reasonableness of AT&T’s rates. Instead, the FCC engaged in a system of 
“continuing surveillance,” in which long-distance rates were established 
through informal negotiations between AT&T and the agency.163  
The experience of the early telephone industry eloquently 
demonstrates why the conventional economic wisdom now rejects ruinous 
competition as the basis for regulation. Eventually, regulated monopoly 
was justified by the ability to use cross-subsidies to support providing 
service in areas that would not otherwise have service. Although the 
conventional wisdom holds that promoting universal service in this manner 
was an objective since the enactment of the Communications Act of 
1934,164 such cross-subsidies were not mentioned during the legislative 
deliberations over the Act and did not emerge until the 1970s, when AT&T 
began to face competition from new long-distance providers. The timing 
suggests that relying on cross-subsidies is again better understood as a 
flight from competition rather than as a principled justification for 
regulated monopoly.165 
 Although policymakers have rejected ruinous competition as a 
justification for using regulation to eliminate competition altogether, they 
have attempted to manage competition for the purpose of facilitating entry. 
For example, the FCC has long imposed asymmetric regulation that 
subjected incumbents to rate regulation even after competition had 
emerged, while refusing to subject new entrants to the same strictures.166 
The FCC was concerned that as long as the incumbent remained dominant, 
it continued to possess sufficient market power to offer supracompetitive 
prices. The advent of competition provided an additional twist, however, 
that made rate regulation even more difficult to enforce. The FCC was also 
concerned that dominant carriers might engage in predatory pricing. 
 
 162. Gerald W. Brock, Historical Overview, in 1 HANDBOOK OF TELECOMMUNICATIONS 
ECONOMICS 43, 53 (Martin E. Cave et al. eds., 2002). 
 163. Id.  
 164. See, e.g., STUDY OF COMMUNICATIONS BY AN INTERDEPARTMENTAL COMMITTEE, 
supra note 72, at 9; BONBRIGHT, supra note 84, at 114-15, 383 n.27; TEMIN, supra note 22, 
at 16. 
 165. MUELLER, supra note 82, at 150-64.  
 166. See generally Scott M. Schoenwald, Regulating Competition in the Interexchange 
Telecommunications Market: The Dominant/Nondominant Carrier Approach and the 
Evolution of Forbearance, 49 FED. COMM. L.J. 367 (1997) (providing an overview of the 
FCC’s rulings on dominance/nondominance). 
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Regulators were thus simultaneously concerned that dominant firms might 
charge prices that were either too high or too low.167 
 The most prominent example of asymmetric rate regulation was with 
respect to long distance during the 1980s, during which time competition 
was just beginning to become established.168 For example, until 1987, the 
FCC required AT&T to pay access charges to local telephone companies 
that were fifty-five percent higher than those paid by other long-distance 
carriers.169 In addition, the FCC exempted new long-distance companies, 
such as MCI and Sprint, from most tariffing requirements, while continuing 
to subject AT&T to rate regulation until its dominance over the long-
distance market dissipated in 1995.170 The courts invalidated the FCC’s 
detariffing decisions, ruling that the agency lacked the power to exempt 
any long-distance carriers from rate regulation.171 The 1996 Act gave the 
FCC the discretion to forbear from enforcing regulations it found to be 
unnecessary to protect consumers or to promote the public interest.172 The 
FCC exercised this new authority to forbear from enforcing the tariffing 
requirements against long-distance carriers, a ruling that was eventually 
upheld by the courts.173 
 In addition, the FCC also attempted to facilitate entry by new long-
distance companies by requiring AT&T to lease portions of its long-
distance network to its competitors. Although the FCC initially invoked a 
number of different rationales, the concern that has emerged as the most 
 
 167. Policy and Rules Concerning Rates for Competitive Common Carrier Servs. & 
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Competition, and the Candice-Coated Monopoly, REGULATION, Mar.-Apr. 1993, at 34; Paul 
W. MacAvoy & Kenneth Robinson, Wining by Losing: The AT&T Settlement and Its Impact 
of Telecommunications, 1 YALE J. ON REG. 1, 31 (1983). 
 169. MTS and WATS Market Structure, Memorandum Opinion and Order, 97 F.C.C.2d 
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F.C.C.R. 3271 (1995). 
 171. MCI Telecomms. Corp. v. AT&T Co., 512 U.S. 218 (1994); AT&T Co. v. FCC, 
978 F.2d 727 (D.C. Cir. 1992); MCI Telecomms. Corp. v. FCC, 765 F.2d 1186 (D.C. Cir. 
1985). 
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Report and Order, 11 F.C.C.R. 20730 (1996), clarified, 12 F.C.C.R. 20787 (1997), aff’d sub 
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important was that the capital requirements needed to establish long-
distance service might impede new entrants from offering nationwide 
service from the outset, which in turn made it more difficult for new 
entrants to compete with AT&T. The FCC therefore imposed regulations 
providing new entrants with access to portions of AT&T’s network to fill 
in the transitional coverage gaps that existed as they built out their 
networks in the hope that new entrants would use access as a stepping stone 
to true facilities-based competition.174 Congress and the FCC also invoked 
this rationale to justify the provisions of the 1996 Act mandating access to 
local telephone networks.175  
 As we discussed in our earlier work, access requirements can be quite 
problematic from the standpoint of both dynamic efficiency and 
administrability.176 As Justice Breyer noted in his separate opinion in Iowa 
Utilities Board: 
[A] sharing requirement may diminish the original owner’s 
incentive to keep up or to improve the property by depriving the 
owner of the fruits of value-creating investment, research, or 
labor. . . . [One cannot] guarantee that firms will undertake the 
investment necessary to produce complex technological 
innovations knowing that any competitive advantage deriving 
from those innovations will be dissipated by the sharing 
requirement.177  
A majority of the Supreme Court later echoed Justice Breyer’s 
concerns about access requirements’ impact on the incumbents’ incentives 
to reinvest in their network in its 2004 Trinko decision.178 In so doing, the 
Court added the additional concern that enforced sharing also deterred 
investment by potential new entrants as well, warning that “[c]ompelling 
such firms to share the source of their advantage . . . may lessen the 
incentive for the monopolist, the rival, or both to invest in those 
economically beneficial facilities.”179 
 
 174. Reg. Policies Concerning Resale & Shared Use of Common Carrier Domestic 
Public Switched Network Services, Report and Order, 83 F.C.C.2d 167, 181-82 para. 32, 
(1980), aff’d sub nom. S. Pac. Comm. Co. v. FCC, 682 F.2d 232 (D.C. Cir. 1982). See 
generally HUBER, KELLOGG & THORNE, supra note 2, § 9.4.2. 
 175. S. REP. NO. 104-230, at 147 (1996) (Conf. Rep.); Local Competition Order, supra 
note 50, at 15509 para. 12; Verizon Comm., Inc. v. FCC, 535 U.S. 467, 491-92 (2002). 
 176. See Yoo, Vertical Integration, supra note 93, at 244-47, 268-69; Spulber & Yoo, 
Access to Networks, supra note 30, at 896-97, 931-33, 970-76. 
 177. AT&T Corp. v. Iowa Utils. Bd., 525 U.S. 366, 428-29 (1999) (Breyer, J., 
concurring in part & dissenting in part) (citation omitted); accord Verizon, 535 U.S. at 550-
51 (Breyer, J., concurring in part & dissenting in part) (noting that compelling incumbents 
to share the cost-reducing benefits of a successful innovation destroys the incumbent’s 
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 178. Verizon Comm., Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, 540 U.S. 398 (2004). 
 179. Id. at 407-08. 
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 The concerns identified by the Supreme Court underscore the extent 
to which access requirements mandate that regulators strike a very delicate 
balance. If access prices are set too high, no one will avail themselves of 
the opportunity, and mandating access will simply impose costs without 
providing any corresponding benefits. If access prices are set too low, new 
entrants will forego facilities-based investment and will instead simply take 
advantage of the pricing offered through regulation. Investment distortions 
can only be avoided if access prices are set at the precise level that would 
mimic competitive outcomes. Establishing what those prices would be is 
extremely difficult in the absence of external, unregulated markets that can 
serve as benchmarks. It is also difficult when regulators are dependent on 
the regulated entity for most of their information, as is often the case in 
local telephony. Moreover, pricing challenges are likely to be particularly 
problematic in industries that are technologically dynamic. 
 A growing empirical literature confirms that the access requirements 
imposed by the 1996 Act have failed to promote investment in new local 
telephone facilities or that new entrants have used access regulation as a 
stepping stone toward full facilities-based competition.180 The consequence 
is that a growing number of advocates who previously supported 
mandating access to telecommunications networks have become 
increasingly skeptical that doing so will provide any substantial economic 
benefits.181 
IV. THE DIFFERENT TYPES OF ACCESS TO LOCAL TELEPHONE 
NETWORKS 
 Another major problem with the current approach to regulating access 
to local telephone networks is the absence of any theory of network 
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configuration. As noted earlier, the current cost-based approach has the 
effect of treating each network element as if it existed in a vacuum without 
taking into account the interactions between individual elements that can 
cause networks to behave in unpredictable ways. The lack of a theory of 
network configuration makes it impossible to assess how altering the costs 
of particular elements and introducing additional flows into a network can 
change optimal network design, network capacity, and network reliability. 
It also obscures the fact that different types of access can have drastically 
different effects on transaction costs. 
 In this Part, we employ a conceptual framework that we have 
developed based on a branch of mathematics known as graph theory to 
analyze access to local telephone networks. Our approach captures one of 
networks’ key attributes: the manner in which they can compensate for 
changes by rerouting traffic in other ways. This causes networks to behave 
like complex systems that cannot be understood by considering their 
individual components in isolation. 
 Graph theory reduces networks into two types of elements.182 
“Nodes” are points from which network flows begin, end, or are redirected. 
Nodes are connected by “links.” The nodes in a last-mile broadband 
network include the servers that provide Internet applications and content, 
the host computers operated by the end-users who are the ultimate 
consumers of applications and content, and the routers in the middle of the 
network that determine along which path particular traffic will flow. The 
links in a last-mile broadband network are the wires (or, in the case of 
wireless Internet, the spectrum channels) that interconnect these servers, 
host computers, and routers. The cost, capacity, and location of each link 
and node can vary.  
 Depicting networks as systems of links and nodes makes it possible to 
analyze how to design networks to deliver the highest levels of 
performance at the lowest cost. For example, the architecture that connects 
all of the nodes in a network with the fewest links is known as a “spanning 
tree.” For a network of n nodes, there exist nn–2 possible spanning trees, 
where n is greater than or equal to two.183 Algorithms exist that make it 
possible to sort through all of the possible spanning trees to identify the 
“minimum spanning tree,” which is the network design that connects all of 
the nodes in the network at the least cost.184 In addition, network owners 
 
 182. For our initial discussion of these principles, see Spulber & Yoo, Graph Theory 
Approach, supra note 9, at 1693-1707. 
 183. See Arthur Cayley, A Theorem on Trees, 23 Q.J. PURE & APPLIED MATHEMATICS 
376 (1889). 
 184. See, e.g., R.C. Prim, Shortest Connection Networks and Some Generalizations, 36 
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Number 1] A UNIFIED ACCESS THEORY 79 
                                                                                                                
have the option of deploying higher-volume server or transmission 
technologies if the reduction in variable cost and improvement in 
performance is large enough to justify incurring the additional capital 
expense. Together, these concepts help determine the least-cost architecture 
for delivering different amounts of network capacity.185 
 Network performance is determined not only by its cost and capacity; 
it also depends on the network’s reliability, typically measured by its 
ability to guarantee certain minimum levels of bandwidth. One of the 
limitations of cost-minimizing architectures like minimum spanning trees is 
that every pair of nodes is connected by a single path. As a result, cost-
minimizing architectures are vulnerable to congestion because the 
saturation of any network element will force the packets into a queue. The 
resulting delays will necessarily degrade network performance. Ensuring 
minimum levels of reliability becomes more difficult as the variability of 
the relevant traffic flows increases. Network owners can increase network 
reliability by adding additional links that create “cycles,” which exist when 
more than one path connects two nodes. Although the introduction of such 
redundancy increases network cost, it also promotes network reliability by 
allowing traffic to be rerouted along different paths if any particular 
pathway becomes congested.186 
 Analyzing networks in this manner permits network owners to choose 
architectures that deliver the levels of network capacity and reliability that 
customers demand at the lowest cost. Mandating access to the network can 
adversely affect each of these dimensions. For example, access mandates 
can alter the volume and patterns of network traffic, either by introducing 
new additional traffic into the network or by diverting traffic outside the 
network until the network owner no longer finds it beneficial to employ 
higher-volume, cost-reducing technologies. In addition, certain types of 
access can reduce the effective capacity of particular network elements by 
occupying some of its functionality. The net effect can alter the costs of 
operating the network as well as the network’s optimal configuration.187  
 Graph theory also shows how networks can ameliorate some of these 
problems. To the extent that some resources are slack, the network can 
reroute traffic along other pathways to compensate for any unexpected 
changes in network volume or network element capacity. Redirecting 
traffic in this manner can increase the cost of operating the network and can 
increase congestion, thereby degrading network performance in those 
portions of the network through which traffic is rerouted—even in areas of 
the network that may be located far from the node from which access is 
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sought. Graph theory thus demonstrates how imposing an access 
requirement can have a dramatic impact on portions of the network that are 
discontinuous with the portion of a network affected by the access 
requirement. In so doing, it reflects the insight that networks are complex 
systems that can only be understood by taking into account the relationship 
between each component, as well as the projected traffic flows.188 
 As a theoretical matter, graph theory could be used as a basis for 
calculating prices directly based on the capacity of each network element 
and the flows being introduced into the system.189 The multidirectional 
nature of the traffic flows in a local telephone network renders direct 
calculation of the resulting prices intractable. 
 To say that graph theory cannot be used to generate prices does not 
mean that it might not yield valuable intuitions. For example, graph theory 
can model how different types of access can have a different impact on 
transaction costs. According to the Coasean theory of the firm, every entity 
decides whether to perform particular production functions internally or to 
contract them out based on which solution minimizes transaction costs.190 
Access mandates disrupt the firm’s natural boundaries by forcing the 
network to externalize functions that it would otherwise perform internally. 
In addition, the fact that access necessarily presupposes that some traffic 
will originate and terminate outside of the network will make it more 
difficult for the network owner to obtain the information about projected 
network flows needed to determine the optimal network design. The fact 
that this information is held by the network owner’s competitors also raises 
the possibility that the party seeking access may attempt to use that 
information to its own strategic advantage. 
 Many of the insights on how mandating network access affects 
network costs, capacity, reliability, and transaction costs can be captured by 
classifying access regimes into the five categories depicted in Figure 1: (1) 
retail access, (2) wholesale access, (3) interconnection access, (4) platform 
access, and (5) unbundled access. Network components owned and 
operated by the network are represented as solid lines and nodes. The 
portions of the network obtained through access requirements are depicted 
by dotted lines.191 
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Figure 1. The Five Forms of Access to Networks 
 
 
The categories vary with the type of entity (e.g., customers, 
competitors, or providers of complementary services), as well as the extent 
of the network to which access is provided. A close analysis of the different 
types of access reveals that each has a different impact on network demand, 
cost, configuration, capacity, reliability, and transaction costs. A better 
understanding of how the impact of each type of access varies provides 
insights into the relative costs and benefits associated with each type of 
access. 
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A. Retail Access 
 Retail access represents perhaps the most common form of access 
imposed on telecommunications providers.192 It provides every end-user 
the right to benefit from the network’s services on the same terms and 
conditions as other end-users. While the FCC has largely deregulated retail 
access for interstate services, state public utility commissions have 
continued to mandate retail access to local telephone networks. Although 
new carriers are often allowed to pick and choose among their customers, 
the incumbent local telephone company is typically designated the “carrier 
of last resort” and is unable to deny service to anyone who requests it. 
Because carriers could render retail access a nullity simply by charging 
exorbitant prices, retail access is generally accompanied by direct 
regulation of retail rates.193 
 Retail access interferes with a network owner’s ability to manage its 
network. Network owners configure their network based on the predicted 
level of network demand to provide service that satisfies consumers’ 
expectations about reliability at the least cost. Unanticipated increases in 
demand leaves the network owner with the option of increasing network 
capacity, refusing to accept new customers, rationing demand by increasing 
prices, or by bringing demand back into line with supply by allowing 
service to degrade. Although expanding network capacity remains the best 
long-term solution, the simple reality that network capacity cannot be 
expanded instantaneously means that that option may not be a short-run 
option. Retail access has the effect of foreclosing the second and third 
solutions by preventing the network owner from refusing customers and by 
limiting the prices it can charge. 
 In addition, designating the incumbent as the carrier of last resort 
gives rise to a moral hazard problem that has been termed “the return of the 
‘prodigal son.’”194 In effect, retail access creates the possibility that a 
customer that leaves the incumbent for a competitor might return, in which 
case the incumbent would have no choice but to provide service. An 
incumbent whose customers demand certain levels of quality will thus have 
to maintain excess capacity as insurance against this possibility. The 
resulting distortion in the optimal network configuration requires the 
incumbent to cross-subsidize its competitors. More importantly, by forcing 
 
 192. For a more complete exposition on retail access, see id. at 639-40, 647-50, 661-62.  
 193. See id. at 639-40; Daniel F. Spulber & Christopher S. Yoo, Mandating Access to 
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(2007). 
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the network owner to deviate from the optimal network configuration, retail 
access inevitably results in a cost increase. 
 The rate regulation inevitably associated with retail access has raised 
additional implementation problems. Regulators have traditionally used a 
cost-of-service approach according to the following formula: 
R = O + Br 
where R is the total revenue the carrier is allowed to generate, O is the 
carrier’s operating expenses on which the carrier is not allowed to earn a 
rate of return (such as taxes, wages, energy costs, and depreciation), B is 
the rate base of capital investment on which the carrier is allowed to earn a 
rate of return, and r is the appropriate rate of return. The rates are then 
determined by dividing the total revenue that the carrier is allowed to earn 
by the number of units consumers are expected to demand. 
 Although this formula is easy to state, regulators and courts have long 
recognized that it is exceedingly difficult to apply. As an initial matter, 
determining the appropriate rate of return has proven quite difficult because 
such a determination depends on identifying other ventures bearing similar 
risk. This determination is complicated by the fact that small differences in 
rates of return can have dramatic effects on the total revenue that the carrier 
is allowed to generate. 
 Determining the proper rate base has also proven to be a significant 
regulatory challenge. Ratemaking authorities initially calculated the rate 
base as “fair value,” usually conceived as the replacement cost of the 
network, which allowed the rate base to reflect changes in value.195 The 
problem was that replacement cost was difficult to administer, typically 
devolving into a battle between experts. Determining how much particular 
configurations of network elements would cost on the current market raised 
difficult problems of proof. In addition, changes in demand and technology 
would often render particular facilities obsolete or would imply a very 
difficult network configuration. The fair value approach left unclear 
whether the rate base would be based on the reproduction cost of the 
network as actually configured or of a hypothetical network configured in 
the most efficient manner. The Supreme Court has called calculating the 
appropriate rate base an “embarrassing question”196 as well as a “laborious 
and baffling task.”197  
 
 195. Although using replacement cost as the rate base is associated with Smyth v. Ames, 
169 U.S. 466, 546 (1898), it did not become clearly established until the next year in San 
Diego Land & Town Co. v. City of National City, 174 U.S. 739, 757 (1899). See generally 
Stephen A. Siegel, Understanding the Lochner Era: Lessons from the Controversy Over 
Railroad and Utility Rate Regulation, 70 VA. L. REV. 187, 227-31 (1984). 
 196. Smyth, 169 U.S. at 546. 
 197. Missouri ex rel. Sw. Bell Tel. Co. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 262 U.S. 276, 292 (1923) 
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 The speculative nature of determining replacement cost led Justice 
Brandeis to propose basing the rate base on historical cost.198 While 
recognizing that historical cost was less economically suited to reflecting 
changes in value, it had the virtue of being easier to administer. At the 
same time, this approach limited the rate base to investments that were 
“prudent,” a determination that tends to be fraught with hindsight bias.199 
Regulators and courts have struggled with the proper methodology for 
calculating the rate base ever since.200 
 Cost-of-service ratemaking also induces a number of systematic 
inefficiencies. As an initial matter, cost-plus pricing regimes give firms 
little incentive to economize. Firms, moreover, are allowed to earn a rate of 
return on capital expenses, but not on operating expenses. Most firms 
usually have the choice to use production processes that are more or less 
capital intensive. The ratemaking methodology discussed above thus 
introduces a bias in favor of capital-intensive solutions, even when other 
solutions would be more efficient.201 Some regulators have attempted to 
eliminate these distortions by introducing price-cap regulation, in which the 
prices firms are allowed to charge do not depend on actual costs. 
Determining initial price levels and price adjustments in subsequent years 
has proven to be extremely difficult.202 The empirical literature is divided 
on whether price caps lead to lower or higher rates.203 
 Retail access can also dull competitive forces in other ways. The 
filing of tariffs requires local telephone companies to give their competitors 
advance notice of any changes in strategy. In addition, collusion is easier to 
maintain when products are undifferentiated and when the prices charged 
are visible. The tariffing process serves both of these functions and even 
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places the state public utility commission in position to punish any 
deviations from the cartel price. Even absent overt collusion, standardizing 
products and increasing price transparency facilitates non-cooperative 
oligopolistic behavior as well. 
 Retail access can also foreclose welfare-enhancing forms of price 
discrimination.204 When fixed costs are large relative to variable costs—as 
is traditionally the case in local telephone service—the average cost curve 
lies above the marginal cost curve over the entire industry output. Thus, 
any price that allows the network owner to cover its costs necessarily 
creates some degree of deadweight loss. Discriminatory pricing regimes, 
such as Ramsey pricing,205 can ameliorate this deadweight loss by 
allocating a larger proportion of the fixed costs to those customers whose 
demand is most inelastic and allocating a smaller proportion to those 
customers who are most price sensitive. In fact, price discrimination can 
theoretically lead to efficient outcomes if fixed costs are allocated in 
perfect inverse proportion to elasticity of demand. 
 Retail access can also increase transaction costs. Historically, many of 
the transaction costs have been the direct costs of participating in the 
tariffing process. Retail access also increases transaction costs indirectly. 
As an initial matter, tariffing provides incentives for competitors to 
challenge rates even when those challenges are unlikely to succeed on the 
merits. To the extent that retail access requires that all customers pay 
uniform rates for uniform services, it also limits network owners’ ability to 
customize their offerings to the needs of particular customers.  
 As noted earlier, retail access can also adversely affect the incentives 
for both incumbents and competitors to invest in network capacity. If retail 
access prices are set too high, they will have no effect. If retail access 
prices are set too low, competitors will find entry and expansion of their 
networks unremunerative because the regulated price will dampen 
customers’ incentives to change networks. At the same time, low access 
prices reduce the incumbent’s incentives to reinvest in their networks as 
well. The alternative is to follow the more orthodox mechanism of allowing 
the presence of short-run supracompetitive returns to signal competitors 
that the market is in long-run disequilibrium and to provide incentives for 
them to expand production. This mechanism can only function if retail 
access prices are set at market levels.  
 The best way to promote economic efficiency would be to base retail 
access rates on the price of local telephone service on the open market. 
 
 204. Christopher S. Yoo, Network Neutrality, Consumers, and Innovation, 2008 U. CHI. 
LEGAL F. (forthcoming 2008).  
 205. See F.P. Ramsey, A Contribution to the Theory of Taxation, 37 ECON. J. 47, 58-59 
(1927). 
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Although local telephone service has long been regarded as a natural 
monopoly in which direct competition is impossible, the emergence of 
platform competition has begun to provide a wide range of possible 
external markets that can serve as bases for determining market value. New 
entrants have followed the lead of the CAPs and have constructed fiber-
optic networks that offer increasing competition with the network operated 
by the incumbent local exchange carriers (LEC).206 
 Even more importantly, providers of wireless telephone services have 
successfully emerged as direct competitors to the incumbent LECs. The 
FCC chose to deploy the first generation of wireless devices, comprised of 
analog cellular telephony, by only issuing two licenses per city, with one of 
those licenses automatically going to the incumbent LEC servicing that 
city.207 As a result, wireless initially offered only modest improvements to 
the competitive environment. The arrival of second generation wireless 
devices, known as “personal communication services” (PCS), significantly 
increased the number of competitive options.208 The result is that the 
wireless telephone industry has become highly competitive, with ninety-
three percent of the U.S. population able to choose from among four 
different wireless providers.209 As a result, Congress preempted state 
regulation of wireless rates in 1993.210 Once third generation wireless 
devices (3G) are fully deployed, competition in the wireless industry is 
likely to provide sufficient competition to drive market-prices towards 
efficient levels. 
 Federal regulatory authorities have been surprisingly reluctant to 
regard wireless as a competitor to traditional local telephone service. For 
example, the legislative history of the 1996 Act indicated that competition 
from cellular telephone companies should not be considered when 
determining whether an incumbent local telephone company faced 
sufficient competition to justify releasing it from the prohibition on 
 
 206. Evan Ramstead & Kortney Stringer, Road Kill: In Race to Lay Fiber, Telecom 
Firms, Wreak Havoc on City Streets, WALL ST. J., Feb. 27, 2001, at A1 (describing recent 
efforts to lay fiber in Atlanta, Austin, Boston, Cincinnati, Dallas, Kansas City, San Antonio, 
Portland, Richmond, and Washington, D.C.). 
 207. Use of the Bands 825-845 MHz & 870-890 MHz for Cellular Comm. Syst., Second 
Report and Order, 86 F.C.C.2d 469, 476-93 paras. 15-47 (1981). 
 208. Amendment of the Comm’n’s Rules to Establish New Personal Comm. Serv., 
Second Report and Order, 8 F.C.C.R. 7700, 7732-33 paras. 73-77 (1993). 
 209. Implementation of Section 6002(b) of Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993: 
Annual Report and Analysis of Competitive Market Conditions with Respect to Commercial 
Mobile Services, Eleventh Report, 21 F.C.C.R. 10947, app. A, tbl.6 (2006). 
 210. Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-66, sec. 6002, § 
332(c)(3)(A), 107 Stat. 312, 394-95 (codified at 47 U.S.C. § 332(c)(3)(A)) (“no State or 
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offering long-distance services.211 State regulators followed a similar 
pattern. When Qwest asked the Idaho Public Utility Commission (PUC) to 
deregulate their rates in light of the emergence of competition from 
wireless, the Idaho PUC found evidence that cell phones are functionally 
equivalent and competitively priced with Qwest’s local service 
unpersuasive.212 
 Regulators have begun to relax this assumption over time. For 
example, the FCC acknowledged in 1998 that wireless is a direct 
competitor to wireline local telephone service after the deployment of 
PCS.213 Most states have completely deregulated local telephone service 
provided to large business customers, which has become quite competitive. 
State regulators are also inching toward deregulating local telephone 
service for residences and small businesses.214 Once that occurs, the 
distortions associated with retail access will disappear. 
B. Wholesale Access 
 Wholesale access is a right given to a network owner’s competitors to 
purchase services normally sold by the network at retail and resell those 
services to end-users.215 Policymakers have also experimented with various 
forms of wholesale access over the years. The issue first arose when the 
New York Public Service Commission and the FCC approved Rochester 
Telephone’s voluntary decision to divest its local telephone network into a 
separate company that would offer basic network services to all comers on 
a wholesale basis.216 Wholesale access was mandated without structural 
separation by the resale provisions of the 1996 Act, which required all 
 
 211. H.R. REP. NO. 104-458, at 147 (1996) (Conf. Rep.) (noting that neither cellular 
service nor resale of a BOC’s local exchange services would satisfy the statutory “facilities-
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Order No. 29360, 2003 WL 22417269 (Idaho Pub. Utils. Comm’n Oct. 20, 2003). 
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and Order, 13 F.C.C.R. 20599, 20622-23 paras. 29-33 (1998); accord Application by SBC 
Comm., Inc., Nev. Bell Tel. Co., and Southwestern Bell Comm. Serv., Inc., for 
Authorization to Provide In-Region, InterLATA Services in Nev., Memorandum Opinion 
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 214. Tardiff, supra note 88, at 125. 
 215. For a more complete exposition on retail access, see Spulber & Yoo, Network 
Regulation, supra note 10, at 640-41, 650-56, 662-69.  
 216. Petition of Rochester Tel. Corp. for Approval of Proposed Restructuring Plan, 
Opinion and Order Approving Joint Stipulation Agreement, 160 Pub. Util. Rep. 4th 554 
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companies providing local telephone service on the day the statute was 
enacted “to offer for resale at wholesale rates any telecommunications 
service that the carrier provides at retail to subscribers.”217 The 
Pennsylvania PUC, while rejecting requests to divide Verizon’s wholesale 
and retail units into separate companies, nonetheless required Verizon to 
provide wholesale access to Verizon’s competitors.218  
 For the reasons we discussed at greater length in our previous 
work,219 wholesale access can adversely affect network performance. As 
noted in the discussion on retail access, unexpected deviations in demand 
can alter the optimal network configuration. The fact that demand under 
wholesale access depends on two prices—both the price of retail and 
wholesale access—renders the impact of wholesale access on network 
demand ambiguous. Depending on these two prices, network demand may 
either increase or decrease, which in turn adversely affects network cost, 
capacity, and reliability of the network. Either result will have an adverse 
impact on the efficiency with which the network owner can provide 
service. 
 By externalizing the marketing functions, wholesale access can also 
increase transaction costs. At a minimum, wholesale access requires local 
telephone companies who were not already offering wholesale access 
services to the public to establish new systems through which competitors 
can order wholesale access and to track the quantity of services being 
provided. Furthermore, according to the Coasean theory of the firm,220 
network owners minimize transaction costs by internalizing functions if, 
and only if, the internal monitoring and organizational costs associated with 
producing a particular input internally are lower than the transaction costs 
to contract for a particular service externally. Indeed, we see a wide variety 
of arrangements with respect to local telephone service. Consider the 
wireless telephone industry, for example. In some cases, wireless 
companies sell part of their output to consumers through proprietary 
outlets, while simultaneously selling part of their output through 
independent retailers, such as Circuit City, Radio Shack, and Best Buy. In 
addition, some wireless providers voluntarily provide wholesale access to 
mobile virtual network operators (MVNOs), which buy network services 
wholesale and combine them with other services, such as customized 
handsets and priority placement of certain content, to provide a unique 
 
 217. 47 U.S.C. § 251(c)(4)(A) (2000). That this provision is what we call a wholesale 
access provision follows from the fact that the statute limits this form of access to services 
“provide[d] at retail to subscribers who are not telecommunications carriers.”  
Id. It is thus restricted to end customers. 
 218. See Verizon Pa., Inc., Order, 95 Pa. P.U.C. 301 (Pa. Publ. Util. Comm’n 2001). 
 219. Spulber & Yoo, Network Regulation, supra note 10, at 656. 
 220. See R.H. Coase, The Theory of the Firm, 4 ECONOMICA 386, 394-98 (1937). 
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product for the customer. Wholesale access disrupts this balance by forcing 
local network owners to make their entire networks available at wholesale 
prices even when it is transaction-cost minimizing for them to do so.  
 Congress thought that this non-facilities-based competition made 
possible by wholesale access might be the only form of competition 
possible in many markets in which a facilities-based competitor was 
unlikely to emerge in the near term.221 As the D.C. Circuit has noted, 
wholesale access provides a “completely synthetic” form of competition.222 
Because all firms are providing service on the same network, there is no 
opportunity for firms to compete either by lowering cost or by providing 
innovations in service. Herbert Hovenkamp describes the type of 
competition in the following terms:  
Imagine that a town has only one seller of bananas, which is the 
local Kroger grocery store. Seeking to promote banana 
competition, the town passes a banana competition ordinance 
requiring Kroger to sell bananas at a steeply discounted 
wholesale price to individual entrepreneurs who push banana 
carts around the store, perhaps underselling Kroger itself by a 
few cents. In this case Kroger supplies the store facility, storage, 
heat, light, and even the bananas themselves, with the small 
sellers supplying little more than their labor. 
  The banana competition ordinance simply confuses 
competition with large numbers of retailers. True banana 
competition would require individual stores with their own 
facilities, purchasing bananas on the market and retailing them 
to consumers. Nevertheless, this is what the 1996 
Telecommunications Act does. Small CLECs can lease most of 
their inputs from the Bells and even locate some of their 
equipment on Bell property. They are entitled to purchase the 
equipment and services they need at regulated wholesale prices, 
and then resell the services in competition with the Bells.223 
It is for this reason that most commentators have found little value in 
the type of competition induced by wholesale access.224 Under wholesale 
access, the only way that providers can compete with one another is by 
squeezing their profit margins until prices converge to cost. Regulatory 
 
 221. H.R. REP. NO. 104-204, pt. I, at 72 (1995). 
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REV. 335, 369-70. 
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authorities could dissipate any rents just as effectively simply by setting 
retail prices at appropriate levels. Indeed, because wholesale access prices 
are typically based on retail prices less any avoided costs, wholesale access 
mandates raise all of the problems associated with regulating retail rates, 
with the added complication that regulators must also determine the 
magnitude of the marketing and operational costs actually avoided.  
 Wholesale access also has the potential to impair dynamic efficiency. 
To have any benefit, wholesale access prices must be set very precisely. If 
set too high, the entire wholesale access regime does not constrain the 
incumbent and instead simply imposes regulatory costs without providing 
any compensating benefits. If set too low, wholesale access destroys 
incentives for competitors to invest in their own networks and dampens the 
incentives for the incumbent to invest in its own facilities, because any 
benefit that it develops would have to be shared at wholesale cost. Indeed, 
the incumbent faces a moral hazard problem in that its competitors can 
avoid the risks of opening new markets simply by waiting until the 
incumbent undertakes the necessary investments and then entering only 
those markets that prove profitable. 
 These difficulties are aptly demonstrated by the two major instances 
in which wholesale access has been mandated. Consider first the Rochester 
Telephone’s Open Market Plan, which proposed separating its local 
telephone network into a separate company that would serve all comers on 
a wholesale basis.225 The New York Public Service Commission (NYPSC) 
soon became concerned that the system of structural separation embodied 
in the Open Market Plan was unworkable. At the same time, the NYPSC 
received repeated requests for decreases in wholesale access prices, 
increasing the discount from full retail price from 5% to as much as 
19.6%,226 as well as complaints about delays and difficulties in the process 
of ordering service. The wholesale access provisions of the Open Market 
Plan were eventually superseded by the 1996 Act and by Global Crossing’s 
acquisition of Rochester. During the period the Open Market Plan was in 
effect, the NYPSC acknowledged that “competition ha[d] yet to develop to 
any noticeable extent.”227 
 
 225. Robert W. Crandall & J. Gregory Sidak, Is Structural Separation of Incumbent 
Local Exchange Carriers Necessary for Competition?, 19 YALE J. ON REG. 335, 379-83 
(2002). 
 226. Id. at 381. 
 227. See Joint Complaint of AT&T Comm. of New York, Inc., MCI Telecomm. Corp., 
WorldCom, Inc. d/b/a LDDS WorldCom and the Empire Ass’n of Long Distance Tele. Cos., 
Inc., No. 95-C-0657, 1998 WL 744059, at *1, *3 (N.Y. Pub. Serv. Comm’n July 15 1998) 
(recognizing that “little competition has developed in the company’s service territory to 
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 Studies analyzing the wholesale access provisions of the 1996 Act 
have similarly concluded that wholesale access has failed to serve either as 
a basis for competition among resellers or as a stepping stone toward 
facilities-based competition.228 In fact, the growth of wholesale access 
appears to be correlated with a drop in investment in facilities by both new 
entrants and incumbents, a connection largely corroborated in financial 
analysts’ reports.229 Likewise, abandonment of wholesale access was 
accompanied by a move toward facilities-based competition through VoIP 
and emerging wireless technologies.230 Indeed, competitors and financial 
analysts agreed that wholesale access was uneconomical as a competitive 
strategy.231 
C. Interconnection Access 
 Interconnection access refers to reciprocal connections between two 
networks competing to offer similar services to the same customers as the 
network owner.232 It gives each provider the right to handoff traffic 
originating on its own network for termination on the other provider’s 
network. It also obligates the provider to terminate traffic originating on the 
competitor’s network. These mandated reciprocal connections combine the 
two smaller networks to form a larger network. 
 Interconnection access arises any time two local telephone companies 
serve the same calling area. Because of the Bell System’s strategy of either 
acquiring competing local systems or ceding the field to those competitors 
that refused to merge, Bell-owned local telephone companies rarely 
operated in the same calling areas as an independent local telephone 
company. It did happen on occasion, such as in the Los Angeles area where 
GTE and Pacific Bell both provided local service to different parts of the 
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Los Angeles area.233 As noted earlier, after the emergence of CAPs 
providing local telephone service in central business districts, the FCC 
mandated interconnection access. The 1996 Act formalized this 
requirement by mandating that all incumbents provide interconnection 
access.234 
 Interconnection access disrupts network management to a much 
greater degree than retail and wholesale access. As we noted in our 
previous work, the impact of interconnection access on network demand is 
ambiguous.235 On the one hand, by increasing the number of customers that 
subscribers can reach, interconnection access causes the value of the 
network to increase, which in turn should cause network demand to 
increase. On the other hand, the presence of alternative local telephone 
networks means that some customers may choose other local telephone 
providers, which places downward pressure on network demand. Whether, 
on balance, network demand will increase or decrease depends on which of 
these two effects dominates. 
 The possibility that network demand may fall means that network 
owners may no longer have sufficient volume to take advantage of cost-
reducing technologies. In addition, in contrast to retail and wholesale 
access, which only mandates access at the edges of the network where the 
network owner already offers service, interconnection access requires the 
creation of new points of entry at major nodes in the middle of the network. 
Networks that do not voluntarily offer service at these points will have to 
create new interfaces to permit interconnection and to meter service at 
these locations. Permitting access at these points also introduces a new 
source of flows in the middle of the network, which can have a major 
impact on optimal network configuration and may cause congestion in 
portions of the network located quite far from the access point. The fact 
that traffic now originates and terminates outside of a single network also 
increases the cost of obtaining the information necessary for network 
planning and creates the possibility of strategic behavior to take advantage 
of the information asymmetries. 
 Some commentators have also warned that incumbent local telephone 
companies can use the refusal to provide interconnection access to harm 
competition.236 They argue that in the absence of interconnection, network 
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economic effects will lead customers to flock to the largest network. Once 
the market reaches its tipping point, the value of the network belonging to 
the dominant player will so far outstrip that of its competitors that the 
market collapses into a natural monopoly. Once tipped, the difficulties that 
new entrants face in generating sufficient volume to “un-tip” the market 
can cause the resulting monopoly to become locked-in. 
 The analysis is not quite so simple, however. Because so much of the 
literature focuses on the potentially anticompetitive consequences of 
network economic effects, it is often overlooked that network economic 
effects also provide powerful incentives in favor of interconnection.237 As 
noted earlier, in a market with a sufficient number of equally-sized players, 
any player that refused to interconnect would put itself at a tremendous 
competitive disadvantage.238 As also noted above, this conclusion is 
reflected in the FCC’s current policy toward interconnection access in the 
wireless industry, in which it concluded that the presence of multiple 
equally sized providers provided sufficient incentive to ensure 
interconnection access even in the absence of regulation.239  
 Furthermore, refusal to interconnect is less likely to harm competition 
in markets undergoing rapid growth because the primary focus in such 
markets is the acquisition of new users.240 The only scenario in which 
equally sized players have an incentive not to interconnect is when two 
equally sized firms engage in a race for the market. Interestingly though, 
this type of competition does not lead to the delays in technology adoption 
and supracompetitive returns associated with refusals to interconnect by 
dominant firms.241 It also has the virtue of promoting the rapid build-out of 
new network technologies. Indeed, this appears to be precisely the type of 
competition that ensued during the early competitive era of local telephone 
service between 1896 and 1907 described above, during which time 
mandating interconnection would only serve to slow the build-out of the 
network. Once the telephone industry had used mergers and division of 
markets to eliminate competition in local telephony, individual companies 
no longer had any incentive not to interconnect because telephone 
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companies with nonoverlapping local service monopolies have every 
incentive to interconnect with one another.242 
 Mandating interconnection access necessarily requires regulatory 
authorities to establish access prices. The 1996 Act requires local carriers 
to interconnect and to settle the charges through a system of mutual and 
reciprocal compensation,243 which the statute provided would be based on 
“a reasonable approximation of the additional costs of terminating such 
calls.”244 The FCC determined that reciprocal compensation rates would be 
based on TELRIC.245  
 As we have discussed in our earlier work, any approach that bases 
prices on the cost of particular network components in essence treats each 
component as if it existed in isolation.246 In so doing, these approaches fail 
to capture networks’ defining characteristic, i.e., that they are complex 
systems in which the value of any one component depends on its 
relationship with and the flows carried by the rest of the network. One of 
TELRIC’s central failings is its inability to take the network’s 
configuration into account. 
 The problem of determining rates is made all the worse by mandating 
interconnection “at any technically feasible point.”247 This requirement 
prevents the network owner from minimizing the adverse impact to its 
system by choosing which facilities to employ when fulfilling any 
particular request for service. In the worst case scenario, the right to 
designate the point of interconnection gives competitors the opportunity to 
act strategically by basing their access requests not on their needs, but 
rather on what would inflict the greatest harm on the network owner. A 
network owner may wish to hedge against this possibility by maintaining 
excess capacity in case one of its competitors decides to request access to a 
key portion of its network. This has the drawback of forcing the network 
owner to make capital investments that may never be used. Indeed, 
competitors that are acting strategically may well take into account whether 
the network owner maintains such excess capacity when deciding whether 
and where to request access. If so, the mere fact that the network owner has 
added excess capacity to hedge against the possibility of a strategic access 
request effectively guarantees that access will be sought elsewhere. 
 The emergence of local telephone competition has begun to provide 
market benchmarks that can obviate the need to establish interconnection 
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access rates through regulation.248 As noted earlier, wireless telephone 
services have successfully emerged as direct competitors to wireline 
telephony. The emergence of the wireless industry is important because 
wireless-to-wireless interconnection is currently unregulated.249 As a result, 
the terms of interconnection between wireless carriers are determined 
through arms-length negotiations that can provide precisely the type of 
external benchmark needed to determine the market value of transport and 
call termination services. Admittedly, interconnection between wireless 
carriers does involve somewhat different considerations than 
interconnection with incumbent LECs. Direct comparisons are complicated 
by the significant differences in utilization rates as well as the emergence 
of wireless pricing schemes that do not differentiate between local and 
long-distance service. The analysis is further obscured by the fact that such 
interconnection between wireless carriers is often accomplished indirectly 
through the LECs.250 Still, as wireless and other facilities-based 
competitors grow, rates charged for interconnection between wireless 
competitors will continue to emerge as a market-based reference point that 
can be used to resolve most pricing problems. The number of external 
benchmarks will only continue to grow as local cable operators and other 
types of broadband providers begin to offer local
 In the absence of external benchmarks based on actual market 
transactions, resort to some cost-based, second-best measure of market 
value becomes necessary. As noted earlier, economic theory suggests that 
cost-based measures should include the foregone benefits that the network 
owner could have enjoyed had it not been required to devote a portion of its 
network element to its competitor. One example is the Efficient Component 
Pricing Rule (ECPR), which sets rates as the sum of the direct incremental 
costs of providing an input and the opportunity costs that the incumbent 
incurs when the new entrant provides the services instead of the 
incumbent.251 The TELRIC methodology incorporates the first of these two 
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components. Unfortunately, it does not include any factor to reflect the 
network owner’s opportunity cost. In so doing, TELRIC in essence 
contradicts the insights of neoclassical economics by basing value solely on 
supply-side concerns without taking demand-side effects into 
consideration. As such, TELRIC is fundamentally inconsistent with the 
analysis of markets that serves as the foundation for all modern economic 
theory.252  
 Although the FCC considered and rejected arguments that it should 
base access rates on ECPR, its reasons for doing so do not withstand 
analysis. The first reason was that the FCC believed that the statutory 
requirement that prices be based on “cost” precluded it from considering 
opportunity cost.253 The Verizon Court specifically rejected this reasoning 
when it found the term, “cost,” to be “too protean” to support any such 
plain language argument.254 If anything, the FCC’s argument is directly 
undercut by the fact that it is now an economic truism that opportunity 
costs represent a true economic cost borne by the incumbent LEC.255 
Indeed, the Supreme Court recognized as much when it cited “opportunity 
cost” as an example of a forward-looking “cost” that fell within the 
purview of the statute.256  
 The FCC’s second reason for rejecting ECPR is equally misplaced. 
The FCC asserted that because ECPR calculates opportunity cost based on 
current retail prices, it locks in supracompetitive returns without providing 
a mechanism for moving prices towards competitive levels.257 The FCC’s 
reasoning overlooks the fact that the emergence of competition will cause 
retail prices to drop as well. Furthermore, any monopoly rents that may be 
present in retail prices are more properly regarded as the result of the 
 
include a non-by-passable end-user charge to compensate incumbent LECs for costs 
stranded by deregulatory innovations that caused investment-backed expectations to fail. 
See SIDAK & SPULBER, supra note 194, at 334-35. Extended discussion of these issues fall 
outside the scope of this Article. For the time being, it suffices to point out that the argument 
advanced in this Article, while consistent with the imposition of such user charges, does not 
require it.  
 252. See Christopher S. Yoo, New Models of Regulation and Interagency Governance, 
2003 MICH. ST. DCL L. REV. 701, 712-13. 
 253. Local Competition Order, supra note 50, at 15859 para. 709. 
 254. Verizon Comm., Inc. v. FCC, 535 U.S. 467, 501 (2002). In the same opinion, the 
court also noted that the term “cost” is “a chameleon” and called it a “virtually meaningless 
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500-01 (internal quotations omitted). 
 255. See SIDAK & SPULBER, supra note 194, at 322-23, 404-10. 
 256. Verizon, 535 U.S. at 499 n.17. 
 257. Local Competition Order, supra note 50, at 15859 para. 709; see also Special 
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revenue” test proposed by Alfred Kahn in setting interconnection rates in the FCC’s Special 
Access Order proceeding). 
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failure of the methodology for implementing retail access than a flaw in 
taking opportunity cost into consideration when setting wholesale rates. 
These concerns may well justify reconsidering the approach for setting 
retail rates. They do not justify distorting wholesale rates, such as 
interconnection access prices, by failing to include some means for taking 
demand-side determinants of value into account.258 
 Although the Supreme Court upheld the FCC’s ratemaking 
methodology in Verizon, it would be a mistake to construe the Court’s 
action as a specific endorsement of TELRIC and a rejection of ECPR as a 
matter of economic policy. The Court was quite careful to reserve 
judgment over the relative merits of any particular economic approach to 
setting access rates. Instead, the Court based its decision on the deferential 
standard of review that gave agencies broad latitude to resolve any 
interpretive ambiguities that exist in the statutes that they administer by 
upholding any proffered construction of the statute so long as it is 
reasonable.259 It would thus be a mistake to read the Court’s decision as 
foreclosing the adoption of a ratemaking approach based on market prices 
or ECPR in the future. 
More fundamentally, even policymakers reluctant to embrace ECPR 
can appreciate the importance of modeling network behavior at the 
systemic level. In fact, the graph theoretical approach that we propose can 
improve telecommunications policy regardless of the particular ratemaking 
methodology employed. 
 Regulators are also experimenting with alternative institutional 
arrangements that obviate the need to set access rates altogether.260 The 
statute made clear that it did not preclude arrangements that waive mutual 
recovery, such as bill and keep.261 Indeed, local telephone companies 
serving the same area, such as Pacific Bell and GTE, have long exchanged 
 
 258. See SIDAK & SPULBER, supra note 194, at 351-58, 362-63. 
 259. Verizon, 535 U.S. at 497-522. The Court noted that “[a]s a reviewing Court we are, 
of course, in no position to assess the precise economic significance of [various economic 
aspects of the incumbent LECs’ arguments]. Instead, it is enough to recognize that the 
incumbents’ assumption may well be incorrect.” Id. at 507. The Court also noted, “[w]e 
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counts.” Id. at 523. See also, AT&T Corp. v. Iowa Utils. Bd., 525 U.S. 366, 426 (1999) 
(Breyer, J., concurring in part & dissenting in part) (noting that in rejecting ECPR, the FCC 
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be arbitrary or unreasonable”). 
 260. Yoo, Economics of Congestion, supra note 81, at 1866-72; and Christopher S. Yoo, 
What Can Antitrust Contribute to the Network Neutrality Debate?, 1 INT’L J. COMM. 493, 
517-21 (2007). 
 261. See 47 U.S.C. § 252(d)(2)(B)(i) (2000). 
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traffic on a bill and keep basis.262 The rationale is that the payments one 
network would receive for terminating traffic from the other network 
would be largely offset by the payments that network would have to pay for 
traffic passing in the opposite direction. Whatever slight differences in 
traffic would not justify incurring the transaction costs needed to account 
for and bill the interchange of traffic. 
 The FCC recognized the potential benefits from such alternative 
institutional arrangements in its initial order implementing the 1996 Act.263 
The emergence of competition in local telephone services made it 
inevitable that some calls would originate on one company’s local 
telephone network and terminate on another’s. Although both the 
originating and terminating carrier would incur costs, the fact that local 
telephone service in the United States operates on a “calling party pays” 
basis, only the originating carrier would receive any payment for the call. 
The 1996 Act established a system of “reciprocal compensation” to 
compensate the terminating carrier for its costs through which originating 
carriers could compensate other carriers for the costs of terminating calls 
originating on other carriers.264 The statute requires that reciprocal 
compensation be based on a reasonable approximation of the costs incurred 
by each carrier. At the same time, the statute specifically leaves open the 
possibility of bill and keep arrangements, in which each carrier retains the 
revenue it receives from its own customers without making any additional 
payments to the other carriers.265  
 The FCC’s initial order implementing the 1996 Act expressed 
skepticism about bill and keep, largely out of concern that bill and keep 
might give originating carriers both the ability and the incentive to impose 
costs onto terminating carriers. For this reason, the FCC concluded that bill 
and keep regimes were generally “not economically efficient.”266  
 That said, the FCC recognizes that circumstances exist under which 
bill and keep may be economically beneficial.267 If the traffic traveling in 
each direction is roughly balanced, any payments made by one carrier to 
the other would simply be offset by similarly sized payments passing in the 
other direction. If so, bill and keep would not create any economic harms 
while at the same time relieving carriers of the administrative burdens and 
 
 262. See Developing a Unified Intercarrier Compensation Regime, Notice of Proposed 
Rulemaking, 16 F.C.C.R. 9610, 9634-37 paras. 69-77 (2002). 
 263. Local Competition Order, supra note 50, at 16055 para. 1112. 
 264. 47 U.S.C. § 251(b)(5). 
 265. See id. § 252(d)(2)(A)-(B). 
 266. Local Competition Order, supra note 50, at 16055 para. 1112. 
 267. Id. 
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transaction costs needed to create and implement systems to meter the 
traffic passing in each direction.268 
 Indeed, bill and keep may be economically efficient even when the 
traffic exchanged between carriers is not symmetrical. The point is most 
easily understood through the following example.  
Suppose that two local networks operate in the same area, with the 
incumbent carrier serving ninety customers and the new entrant serving ten 
customers. Each customer makes ten calls randomly distributed throughout 
the entire customer base. One would expect the customers of the dominant 
carrier to initiate 900 calls. Ninety percent (or 810) of those calls would 
terminate on the incumbent’s network, while ten percent (ninety) would 
terminate on the new entrant’s network. At the same time, one would 
expect the new entrant’s customers to place one hundred calls, ten percent 
(ten) of which would terminate on the new entrant’s network and ninety 
percent (ninety) of which would terminate on the dominant carrier’s 
network. Thus, if originations and termination are symmetric and randomly 
distributed, ninety calls would pass from the incumbent’s network to the 
new entrant’s network, and the same number of calls would pass in the 
other direction. Under these circumstances, metering actual usage would 
provide no economic benefits even though the total traffic handled by each 
network would be far from balanced.  
As noted above, GTE and Pacific Bell interconnected on a bill and 
keep basis when serving adjacent neighborhoods in Los Angeles despite 
the fact that the size of their customer bases was far from symmetrical.269 
The implication is that the transaction cost economies associated with 
avoiding metering costs outweighed what little benefit would have resulted 
from a more accurate accounting of the actual traffic flows. Note that a far 
different situation holds if one carrier’s customers disproportionately make 
calls that terminated on the other carrier’s network. In addition, the 
symmetry of terminations and originations does not hold if one carrier only 
terminates calls, as would occur for carriers providing service to paging 
service providers, call centers, or Internet service providers. In those cases, 
the resulting asymmetry on a calling party system would lead to substantial 
distortions.270 
 Economic theory has identified one way in which even last-mile 
providers without market power in the national market can nonetheless use 
their terminating access monopoly to harm competition.271 This market 
 
 268. Id. 
 269. See supra note 262 and accompanying text. 
 270. Local Competition Order, supra note 50, at 16043 para. 1092. 
 271. See ROBERT CRANDALL & LEONARD WAVERMAN, TALK IS CHEAP: THE PROMISE OF 
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failure results from what is in essence a common pool problem stemming 
from the fact that the United States follows the practice that the calling 
party pays the long-distance carrier for the entirety of the long-distance 
call. Long-distance carriers are, of course, not the only carriers that incur 
costs when a customer places a long-distance call. The LEC for the party 
originating the call must incur costs to provide a connection between the 
customer’s premises and the long-distance carrier’s point of presence in the 
originating LEC’s central office. Furthermore, the terminating LEC must 
also incur the cost of connecting the call from its central office to the 
customer premises of the party to whom the call is placed. Long-distance 
carriers compensate originating and terminating LECs through a series of 
federally mandated access charges, which under current law must be 
uniform across all carriers and all customers.272 In other words, the cost of 
terminating access is covered by requiring customers to make uniform 
contributions to a common pool. 
 The key question is what impact the deregulation of access charges 
would have on originating and terminating LECs’ pricing behavior. The 
FCC has concluded that the possibility that the originating carrier might 
charge excessive access charges is effectively limited by the fact that the 
calling party chooses its local service provider, decides whether to place 
the call, and ultimately bears the cost of the call.273 The calling party, either 
directly or indirectly through its long-distance carrier, is thus well situated 
to exert price discipline over originating access charges. The same is not 
true, however, for terminating access charges. Because neither the calling 
party nor its long-distance carrier has any influence over the called party’s 
choice of LEC; neither can exert any price discipline over terminating 
access charges. Furthermore, the common pool aspect of the access charge 
regime means that LEC customers will not bear the full brunt of any 
increase in terminating access charges. Instead, the impact of the higher 
prices will be spread over the entire universe of local telephone subscribers. 
This, in turn, gives terminating LECs both the ability and the incentive to 
raise terminating access charges above competitive levels in order to draw 
a disproportionate amount of compensation out of the common pool. The 
impetus to increase terminating access charges exists regardless of whether 
competition in local access exists or the terminating LEC is small. Indeed, 
small carriers may well have the greatest incentive to increase terminating 
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 272. Developing a Unified Intercarrier Compensation Regime, Further Notice of 
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access charges because the percentage of the increase to their own 
customers will be disproportionately small. At the same time, such pricing 
behavior might give long-distance carriers greater incentive to enter the 
local access market in order to avoid paying these charges.  
 A number of mechanisms exist to solve this problem without 
mandating interconnection. For example, the incentive to increase 
terminating access charges would disappear if the FCC were to mandate 
bill and keep. Indeed, any uniform access pricing regime would eliminate 
the ability for terminating LECs to take advantage of the common pool 
problem, although economic efficiency would ultimately depend on 
ensuring that access prices are set at competitive levels. In addition, LECs’ 
incentive to increase terminating access charges could also be eliminated 
by mandating that terminating access charges be reciprocal, although 
reciprocity may have implications for entry.274 Reciprocity is not as 
effective when LECs do not originate and terminate traffic in a roughly 
symmetrical manner, as illustrated by disputes over carriers that only serve 
customers that receive calls, such as Internet service providers, conference 
call companies, and chat rooms, as evidenced by the recent dispute over 
“traffic-pumping.”275 Finally, the terminating access charges used by the 
incumbent LEC with which the new entrant competes can be used as a 
benchmark for determining the reasonableness of the new entrant’s 
terminating access charges.276 A complete resolution of this issue exceeds 
the scope of this Article. For our purposes, determining which of these 
different mechanisms would best promote consumer welfare is less 
important than the fact that institutional mechanisms may exist for solving 
the terminating access problem that do not require imposing an access 
mandate. 
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D. Platform Access 
 Platform represents the type of access most often granted through 
regulation. Platform access occurs when the government mandates that a 
network owner provide nondiscriminatory access to providers of 
complementary services. Implementation of platform access requires the 
creation of a standard and the nondiscriminatory provision of network 
service to anyone presenting data configured in accordance with that 
standard.277 For example, the FCC’s Part 68 Rules,278 which can be traced 
to the FCC’s landmark decision in Carterfone,279 have long required the 
Bell System to open its local telephone networks to all providers of CPE. 
As a result of MCI’s long battle with AT&T, the FCC has also required the 
Bell System to open its local telephone network to all providers of long-
distance services.280 Furthermore, the FCC’s Computer Inquiries required 
local telephone companies to open their networks to all providers of 
information services.281 Similar mandates were included in the consent 
decree breaking up AT&T and the related consent decree regarding 
GTE.282 In each case, this regulation is properly regarded as platform 
access because it involves opening up the network to providers of 
compleme
 The 1996 Act essentially left this system undisturbed. With respect to 
long distance, § 251(c)(2) requires all carriers providing local telephone 
service to provide interconnection to any carrier for the transmission and 
routing of long-distance access that is equal in quality to the 
interconnection the local telephone company provides to itself on rates, 
terms, and conditions that are just, reasonable, and nondiscriminatory.283 
The FCC construed this provision to apply only to the physical linking of 
the two networks and not for the charges for transporting and terminating 
long-distance traffic.284 Indeed, as the Eighth Circuit reasoned in upholding 
the FCC’s decision, § 251(g) specifies that the preexisting equal access and 
interconnection requirements would remain in place until specifically 
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superseded by the FCC.285 Because the advent of competition would put 
pressure on any cross-subsidies embedded in access charges, the FCC 
initiated an access charge proceeding designed to make transport pricing 
entirely cost-based.286  
 The 1996 Act similarly left undisturbed the mandate that local 
telephone companies must provide equal access to information service 
providers.287 It augmented those requirements with a number of other 
provisions, including requiring incumbents to allow information service 
providers to resell local telephone services at wholesale rates and to 
provide unbundled access to key elements of their networks.288 The FCC 
continued to regard information service providers as customers of the local 
telephone network rather than as long-distance providers that had to pay 
access charges.289 Concerns about preserving platform access also underlay 
the statutory provisions in the 1996 Act prohibiting the former BOCs from 
offering long-distance service, information services, and alarm 
monitoring.290 The idea was that, until competition emerged in local 
telephone service, these firms would have the incentive to discriminate 
against nonproprietary, complementary service offerings. 
 Providing greater accessibility to complementary services and 
reducing the business risk faced by providers of those services should cause 
network demand to increase.291 At the same time, platform access 
inevitably involves a number of collateral requirements that can become 
sources of inefficiency and place downward pressure on network demand. 
For example, local telephone networks give rise to certain technological 
efficiencies that can only be realized if the same carrier provides both the 
complementary and the local telephone service. Classic examples include 
voice messaging services, such as voice mail and advance calling, and 
vertical switching services, such as caller ID, call forwarding, and call 
waiting, which are most efficiently provided when integrated directly into 
the circuit switch.292 The FCC eventually exempted such innovations from 
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its platform access requirements for the simple reason that failure to do so 
would have prevented these innovations from emerging.293  
 Platform access also necessarily requires regulators to designate the 
location within the network to interface with complementary service 
providers, as well as the format in which the complementary service is 
configured. The optimal level of standardization depends largely on the 
magnitude of the demand-side scale economies and the heterogeneity of 
consumer preferences. If preferences are sufficiently heterogeneous, the 
value that consumers derive from consuming a service that is a better 
match with their preferences will dominate the benefits from belonging to a 
larger network, in which case an equilibrium with multiple standards may 
well be optimal. 
 Standardization also inevitably favors applications based on certain 
architectures. For example, the introduction of digital transmission 
technologies required the deployment of protocols that were not 
interoperable with the existing analog network. This necessitated the 
introduction of computer processing into the core of the network to engage 
in “protocol conversion.”294 Absent a waiver from the platform access 
mandate, the interoperability mandated by the Computer Inquiries would 
have obstructed this innovation from being deployed.295 It is impossible to 
conclude a priori that standardizing on single network architecture 
represents the optimal solution. The process is rendered even more 
challenging if the technology is undergoing rapid change. Under the best of 
circumstances, regulation will lock the existing interface into place at least 
until the regulatory process can update it. At worst, such technological 
decisions will be affected by the biases inherent in regulatory processes, in 
which the concerns of the incumbents tend to be overrepresented. 
 The standardization implicit in platform access also commoditizes 
network services and narrows the dimensions along which local telephone 
networks can compete. Product standardization and price transparency 
make both collusive and noncooperative oligopolistic behavior easier to 
maintain. Commoditization also limits networks to competing solely based 
on price and network size, considerations that reinforce the advantages 
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enjoyed by the largest players. Differentiation can play a particularly 
important role in industries like telecommunications, in which the presence 
of fixed costs that are large relative to marginal costs, forces network 
providers to produce on the declining portion of the average cost curve. As 
Edward Chamberlin pointed out in his classic work on monopolistic 
competition, product differentiation can create stable equilibriums with 
multiple producers each producing on the declining portion of the average 
cost curve.296 Thus, smaller players can survive despite cost and size 
disadvantages by targeting subsegments of the market. 
 Platform access also gives rise to significant transaction costs, both in 
terms of establishing the governing standards and in terms of establishing 
the interface. This includes putting into place processes at those interfaces 
for monitoring and billing the service provided to existing customers and 
for provisioning service to new customers. As Justice Breyer has noted, 
such an interface is likely to be particularly burdensome to police when the 
interface is complex and embedded in the middle of the network and when 
the information requirements needed to regulate the interface are high.297 
The breakup of AT&T provides a useful example. Implementing the 
divestiture decree’s equal access mandate required the local telephone 
companies to redesign their switches so that they could accommodate 
multiple long-distance providers—a process that entailed considerable cost 
and delay, as well as close regulation of both the price and nonprice terms 
and conditions of interconnection. Such oversight is particularly onerous 
when the interface and the information requirements needed to implement 
it are complex.298 Furthermore, like any form of access, platform access 
requires direct regulation of prices in order to be effective, both in terms of 
nondiscrimination and in terms of price levels. There is thus little reason to 
be optimistic that such regulation will prove beneficial. 
 Most problematic is platform access’s long-run impact on dynamic 
efficiency. As noted earlier, the primary policy goal should be to promote 
entry in those segments of the industry that are the least competitive. Only 
if competition in a particular segment proves unsustainable should 
policymakers pursue the second-best policy goal of promoting competition 
in complementary services. Once local telephone competition became 
possible, platform access became counterproductive. Providers of 
complementary services were the natural strategic partners for new entrants 
in local telephone service. Platform access short-circuited this natural 
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alliance by obviating the need for any complementary service providers to 
enter into such partnerships. 
 At the time most of the platform access mandates discussed above 
were put into place, competition in local telephone service was believed to 
be impossible. The FCC recognized, when eliminating the regulatory 
requirements imposed by the Computer Inquiries, that those rules “were 
developed before separate and different broadband technologies began to 
emerge and compete for the same customers” and could no longer be 
justified under contemporary circumstances.299 In short, it is now clear that 
wireline competition is feasible with respect to large business customers 
and that wireless telephony has emerged as a vibrant competitor as well. 
 Lastly, network owners have powerful incentives to provide platform 
access voluntarily.300 The economic consensus is that competition among 
local telephone providers is sufficient to prevent those providers from 
engaging in anticompetitive behavior against providers of complementary 
services. Even if the local telephone market is not competitive, moreover, 
network owners are still likely to provide platform access voluntarily 
because opening networks to the broadest possible array of complementary 
services typically represents the best way for a carrier to maximize the 
value of its local telephone network. Although economic theorists have 
identified a narrow set of circumstances under which that would not be 
true, those exceptions are fairly narrow and require the satisfaction of fairly 
restrictive conditions. 
 Unfortunately, policymakers have been loathe to take wireless 
competition into account when deciding whether to release local telephone 
companies from platform access mandates. For example, the legislative 
history of the 1996 Act indicated that competition from cellular telephone 
companies should not be considered when determining whether an 
incumbent local telephone company faced sufficient competition to justify 
releasing it from the prohibition on offering long-distance services.301 The 
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FCC would later retreat from this position and acknowledge wireless as a 
direct competitor to wireline local telephone service after the deployment 
of PCS.302  
 Over time, policymakers have narrowed the scope of local telephone 
networks’ platform access obligations. With respect to long-distance 
service, the FCC has ruled that the local telephone companies created by 
the breakup of AT&T now face sufficient competition to justify permitting 
them to offer in-region long-distance service in every state except Alaska 
and Hawaii.303 As discussed in greater detail elsewhere, the dissipation of 
the need for platform access to preserve long-distance competition is 
demonstrated most eloquently by the regulatory authorities’ approval of 
SBC’s acquisition of AT&T and Verizon’s acquisition of MCI, which 
reconsolidated local and long-distance services. 304 
 In addition, the FCC has eliminated the platform access for 
information services. As the FCC recognized when eliminating the 
regulatory requirements imposed by the Computer Inquiries, those rules 
“were developed before separate and different broadband technologies 
began to emerge and compete for the same customers” and could no longer 
be justified under contemporary circumstances.305  
 Lastly, the FCC has acknowledged that the increase in competition 
has weakened the ability of last-mile providers to discriminate in favor of 
proprietary CPE. For example, in 1992 the FCC abolished the prohibition 
on bundling CPE with wireless telephone services.306 The FCC issued this 
order at a fairly early stage in the wireless industry’s development when the 
evidence of the competitiveness of the wireless industry was 
“inconclusive.”307 As noted earlier, the FCC initially established the 
wireless industry in 1981 through a duopoly market structure and had not 
yet begun to auction PCS licenses. The FCC nonetheless found the 
possibility that some cellular providers might possess a degree of local 
market power insufficient to justify prohibiting the bundling of CPE with 
wireless telephone service because any one cellular provider represented a 
tiny fraction of the national equipment market.308 Any CPE manufacturer 
 
 302. See, supra note 132 and accompanying text. 
 303.  FCC, BOC AUTHORIZATIONS TO PROVIDE IN-REGION INTERLATA SERVICES UNDER 
SECTIONS 271 AND 272, supra note 132 (reporting that the FCC has ruled that local 
telephone companies are subject to sufficient competition to permit them to offer in-region 
long-distance service in every state except Alaska and Hawaii). 
 304. See Spulber & Yoo, Mandating Access, supra note 193, at 1903. 
 305. Wireline Broadband Order, supra note 299, at 14876-77 para. 42. 
 306. Bundling of Cellular Customer Premises Equipment and Cellular Service, Report 
and Order, 7 F.C.C.R. 4028 (1992). 
 307. Id. at 4031-32 para. 27. 
 308. Id. at 4028-29 para. 7, 4029-30 paras. 13-18. 
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foreclosed from distributing its products in one geographic area remained 
free to sell its products in other areas. As the Federal Trade Commission’s 
comments during this proceeding note, “‘[i]f individual cellular service 
companies do not possess market power in the sale of cellular service on a 
national level, it is unlikely that foreclosure of the CPE market can be 
successful.’”309 The FCC agreed, concluding that “it does not seem likely 
that individual cellular companies which operate in local markets possess 
market power that could impact the numerous CPE manufacturers 
operating on a national and international basis.”310 The proper question is 
thus, not the number of subscribers that a network controls in any one 
metropolitan area, but rather the network’s market share in the national 
market. In short, it is national reach, not local reach, that matters. The FCC 
found that not only is bundling an efficient way to distribute CPE, “the 
high price of CPE represented the greatest barrier to inducing subscription 
to cellular service.”311 Bundling wireless service with CPE allows wireless 
carriers to reduce the up-front cost of subscribing to cellular, which in turn 
will support greater competition and promote more efficient use of the 
spectrum.312 
 Similarly, the FCC concluded in 2001 that the growth in competition 
among local exchange carriers justified abolishing its prohibition of 
bundling CPE with wireline telecommunications services.313 Even though 
local exchange markets were not yet perfectly competitive, the FCC 
concluded that the growth of local competition and the consumer benefits 
of bundling—such as the reduction of transaction costs and increase in 
innovation in services—sufficiently mitigated the risk of anticompetitive 
harm.314 The FCC has also abandoned its previous role in establishing the 
technical criteria for interconnecting CPE, although the FCC stopped short 
of repealing the interconnection requirements altogether.315 
E. Unbundled Access 
 Unbundled access is a right given to competitors using individual 
components of the incumbent’s network.316 Local telephone networks have 
 
 309. Id. at 4029-30 para. 13 (emphasis added). 
 310. Id. 
 311. Id. at 4030-31 para. 19. 
 312. Id. 
 313. Policy and Rules Concerning the Interstate, Interexchange Marketplace, Report and 
Order, 16 F.C.C.R. 7418, 7424 para. 10 (2001). 
 314. Id. at 7424 para. 10, 7436-37 paras. 30-31, 7438-40 paras. 33-36. 
 315. 2000 Biennial Reg. Review of Part 68 of the Comm’n’s Rules and Regs., Report 
and Order, 15 F.C.C.R. 24944, paras. 16-17, 24951-53 paras. 20-23 (2000). 
 316. For a more complete exposition on unbundled access, see Spulber & Yoo, Network 
Regulation, supra note 10, at 645-46, 658-60, 671-73.  
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long represented one of the central laboratories in which regulatory 
authorities have experimented with unbundled access as a way to guard 
against vertical exclusion without foreclosing the benefits of vertical 
integration. As discussed above, the open network architecture regime 
created by Computer Inquiry III represents perhaps the seminal example of 
FCC-mandated unbundling.317 The UNE access provision enacted by 
Congress constitutes perhaps the most important provision of the 
Telecommunications Act of 1996, with UNE access prices being based on 
TELRIC.318 Other important antecedents include state unbundling 
initiatives between 1984 and 1996, as well as the unbundling model 
developed by the U.S. Department of Justice in negotiations to allow 
Ameritech to begin selling in-region long-distance services.319 
 Unbundled access is the form of access that has the greatest potential 
to cause economic inefficiency. Like wholesale and interconnection access, 
the fact that unbundled access simultaneously supports the creation of new 
services and diverts traffic off of the network renders the impact of 
unbundled access on network demand ambiguous. Both increases and 
decreases in network demand change the optimal network configuration, 
either by making the creation of links in particular locations or cost-
reducing, traffic-aggregating technologies economically feasible or 
infeasible. 
 At the same time, unbundled access disrupts network management to 
a far greater degree than other forms of access. Unlike the other forms of 
access, which generally introduce traffic at the major nodes where 
customers or providers of complementary services would naturally 
interconnect with the network, unbundled access can introduce traffic deep 
within the heart of the network. Unbundled access has the potential to 
occupy isolated resources at multiple, disconnected points in the network. 
In contrast, other forms of access involve large, integrated portions of the 
network to route traffic in patterns that are roughly similar to the traffic 
served by the network owner.  
 As we described elsewhere, graph theory reveals how occupying 
isolated resources in one part of the network can adversely affect the 
performance of portions of the network located far from the element being 
accessed. 320 Graph theory thus demonstrates the potential flaw in the idea 
that the costs of unbundled access are confined to the network elements 
that are directly involved. Instead, interconnection by competitors is likely 
to introduce new sources and sinks into the network. Thus, substantial 
 
 317. See discussion supra pages 48-51. 
 318. See discussion supra page 112-13. 
 319. HUBER, KELLOGG & THORNE, supra note 2, §§ 5.4.7-8. 
 320. See Spulber & Yoo, Graph Theory Approach, supra note 9, at 1703-13. 
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amounts of traffic may originate and terminate at points in the network that 
differ from the host network’s initial points of origin and termination. This 
will alter traffic patterns. A network that is designed with a maximum 
flow/minimum cut pattern designed around particular sources and sinks 
will no longer be appropriate for traffic coming from new sources and 
sinks. The nodes at which interconnection occurs will not be the only nodes 
affected. Rather, the effects will be distributed across all nodes and links 
within the network. This invalidates the notion that only the incremental 
costs of providing the interconnection should be recovered. The 
interconnection affects the network’s performance and creates costs 
throughout the network. 
 Moreover, graph theory shows that one should not expect the effects 
of UNE access to be confined to those elements. When individual elements 
are viewed in isolation, the TELRIC methodology seems quite reasonable. 
Typically, UNE access occupies only a few of the elements of an 
incumbent LEC’s network. Those elements, however, can be critical to 
overall traffic patterns that connect the network’s sources and sinks. The 
reduction of available capacity on critical links in the network will affect 
the network’s maximum flow. Thus, UNE access can impose costs on the 
host network that extend well beyond the elements that are affected. 321 In 
some cases, the costs of UNE access may even exceed interconnection 
costs. If usage patterns associated with interconnection are similar to those 
of the incumbent LEC’s own traffic, absent any capacity constraints, there 
will be less of an impact on the network owner’s decisions about network 
configuration. There will be no change in the network elements that 
comprise the minimum cut and, thus, in the components that constitute 
bottlenecks. The situation is quite different when usage patterns associated 
with interconnection differ from the patterns of the incumbent’s own 
traffic. When that is the case, granting access to critical UNEs can create 
bottlenecks where none previously existed and can have a dramatic impact 
on the network’s maximum flow. Under these circumstances, UNE access 
can have a dramatic impact on the cost, capacity, and configuration of 
networks. 322 
 These problems are exacerbated by the fact that the 1996 Act 
obligates the network owner to permit unbundled access “at any technically 
feasible point.”323 The introduction of traffic flows at disaggregated points 
chosen by competitors deep in the heart of the network, where such traffic 
would not otherwise occur, has a much greater potential to cause 
 
 321. Id. 
 322. Id. 
 323. 47 U.S.C. § 251(c)(2)(B) (2000). 
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discontinuous and unpredictable disruptions to the network than other 
forms of access. 
 In addition, unbundled access increases transaction costs to a greater 
degree than other forms of access. For example, a network owner 
attempting to manage its network will need a great deal of information 
about the magnitude, timing, and variability of traffic associated with each 
element to which unbundled access is sought. The fact that much of the 
traffic will originate and be transmitted, at least in part, on other networks 
places much of this information outside the network owner’s control. 
 Further, it forces network owners to develop systems for provisioning 
and monitoring network usage at points that would not otherwise be 
available to customers or other carriers. As Justice Breyer noted in 
criticizing the 1996 Act’s UNE access requirements in Iowa Utilities 
Board: 
The more complex the facilities, the more central their relation 
to the firm’s managerial responsibilities, the more extensive the 
sharing demanded, the more likely these costs will become 
serious. And the more serious they become, the more likely they 
will offset any economic or competitive gain that a sharing 
requirement might otherwise provide.324  
He further observed that unbundled access “can have significant 
administrative and social costs inconsistent with the Act’s purposes.”325 If 
taken to an extreme, “[r]ules that force firms to share every resource or 
element of a business would create not competition, but pervasive 
regulation, for the regulators, not the marketplace, would set the relevant 
terms.”326  
 Most problematically, unbundled access delays the emergence of 
facilities-based competition by deterring investment in alternative last-mile 
facilities. Justice Breyer’s separate opinion in Iowa Utilities Board 
described how unbundled access reduces incumbents’ incentives to invest 
in their own networks when he pointed out that unbundled access: 
may diminish the original owner’s incentive to keep up or to 
improve the property by depriving the owner of the fruits of 
value-creating investment, research, or labor . . . . [One cannot] 
guarantee that firms will undertake the investment necessary to 
produce complex technological innovations knowing that any 
competitive advantage deriving from those innovations will be 
dissipated by the sharing requirement.327  
 
 324. AT&T Corp. v. Iowa Utils. Bd., 525 U.S. 366, 428-29 (1999) (Breyer, J., 
concurring in part and dissenting in part) (internal citations omitted). 
 325. Id. at 428. 
 326. Id. at 429. 
 327. Id. at 428-29. 
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In Verizon v. FCC, Justice Breyer reiterated the negative impact that 
unbundled access on incumbents’ incentive “either to innovate or to invest 
in a new ‘element.’”328 Unbundled access envisions “that the incumbent 
will share with competitors the cost-reducing benefits of a successful 
innovation, while leaving the incumbent to bear the costs of most 
unsuccessful investments on its own. Why would investment not then 
stagnate?”329 
 Unbundled access reduces the investment incentives of new entrants 
as well as incumbents. TELRIC bases UNE access prices on the costs of a 
hypothetical, most efficient network. Justice Breyer observed that this 
pricing approach essentially guarantees that new entrants will find it more 
cost effective to obtain unbundled access to elements of the existing 
network than to build or buy those network elements elsewhere.330 
Furthermore, new entrants must take into account the fact that any future 
technological improvements will cause UNE access rates to fall still 
further. Thus, any firm considering building its own facilities faces the real 
possibility that regulation will place it at a cost disadvantage, as TELRIC 
ensures that other competitors will be able to take advantage of any cost 
reductions that take place in the future without having to undertake the risk 
of making any investments. This will not only harm new entrants who 
invest in facilities, it will induce firms to compete by sharing the existing 
network even though lower-cost alternatives exist. Although the FCC 
claims that unbundled access “will sometimes ‘serve as a transitional 
arrangement until fledgling competitors could develop a customer base and 
complete the construction of their own networks,’”331 Justice Breyer asks, 
“[w]hy, given the pricing rules, would those ‘fledgling competitors’ ever 
try to fly on their own?”332 
 Lastly, Justice Breyer acknowledged that unbundled access leads to 
an extremely thin form of competition: 
That is because firms that share existing facilities do not 
compete in respect to the facilities that they share, any more than 
several grain producers who auction their grain at a single jointly 
owned market compete in respect to auction services. Yet rules 
that combine a strong monetary incentive to share with a broad 
definition of “network element” will tend to produce widespread 
sharing of entire incumbent systems under regulatory 
 
 328. Verizon Comm. Inc. v. FCC, 535 U.S. 467, 551 (2002) (Breyer, J., concurring in 
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 331. Id. at 551 (quoting UNE Remand Order, supra note 69, at 3700 para. 6).  
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supervision—a result very different from the competitive market 
that the statute seeks to create.333 
A majority of the Supreme Court would ultimately endorse all aspects 
of Justice Breyer’s reasoning in the Trinko decision.334 As we noted earlier, 
empirical studies have demonstrated the negative impact that unbundled 
access has on investments in local telephone facilities. 
 It is for this reason that the unbundled access provisions of the 1996 
Act contain some limiting principles. Specifically, it limits UNE access to 
elements to which access is “necessary” and without which a new 
competitor would be impaired in its ability to offer competing services.335 
These limitations recognize that little is to be gained and much to be lost by 
compelling access to elements available on the open market for other 
sources.  
 The FCC has faced nearly insuperable difficulties to construe these 
limitations in a way that makes economic sense. As noted earlier, the FCC 
needed four tries to develop rules that could withstand judicial scrutiny. 
And by this time, the unbundling rules had largely become moot, as the 
FCC had deregulated unbundling of network elements providing service to 
large business customers and had deregulated key network elements needed 
to provide local telephone service to small business and residential 
customers. 
F. Regulatory Arbitrage 
 Organizing the different types of access into distinct categories 
inevitably poses significant definitional challenges, particularly in an 
industry undergoing dynamic technological change. The differences in 
compensation regimes allow providers to engage in regulatory arbitrage by 
altering access rates simply by changing the way that service is 
characterized or by making relatively small technological changes. 
 Consider, for example, the proper categorization of the first 
generation of Internet service providers—such as the original services 
offered by CompuServe, Prodigy, and America Online—which established 
local offices housing modem banks through which consumers could 
connect to the Internet through their dial-up modems. It is possible to 
conceptualize the access provided to these companies in any one of four 
ways. First, these companies could simply be regarded as end-users simply 
purchasing business lines from the local telephone company, in which case 
 
 333. Id. at 550-51 (internal citations omitted). 
 334. Verizon Comm., Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, 540 U.S. 398 (2004). For 
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& Yoo, Mandating Access, supra note 193, at 1864-67. 
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they would be provided service through retail access.336 Second, these 
companies could also be characterized as providing complementary 
services, in which case they would receive service via platform access. 
Third, these companies could declare themselves to be a specialized local 
telephone company serving a single customer and seek service through 
interconnection access. Fourth, these companies could use unbundled 
access to purchase all of the elements they needed to provide service to 
their end customers. 
 These difficulties would be of little concern if a single, consistent 
pricing regime applied to all of these different types of access. 
Unfortunately, different types of access are governed by different 
ratemaking approaches and are often imposed by different regulatory 
entities. Retail access is regulated by state PUCs employing either cost-of-
service ratemaking or price caps. Retail rates often include a wide variety 
of specialized waivers and reflect a wide range of internal cross-subsidies, 
through state-wide rate averaging and through differential pricing of 
business and residential services. The fact that prices are not always set in a 
way that reflects cost within a single jurisdiction raises the possibility of 
arbitrage even within retail access.  
 Wholesale access rates are often said to be constructed from the top 
down, in that they are typically based on retail rates less any avoided costs, 
such as marketing, billing, and collection. The fact that these rates are 
based on rates incorporating implicit cross-subsidies again leaves 
wholesale access vulnerable to regulatory arbitrage. Further inefficiency 
may result from difficulties in determining precisely which retailing costs 
are avoided when another provider invokes wholesale access. 
 Platform access rates often said to be built from the bottom up, in that 
they are based on the cost of providing particular services. Platform access 
rates vary widely depending on the nature of the complementary service 
being provided. Long-distance providers pay access charges that have 
historically exceeded actual cost, in order to allow long-distance service to 
cross-subsidize local service.337 Information service providers, in contrast, 
have long been exempt from access charges.338 Although the FCC is in the 
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process of reforming the access charge regime, the agency has consistently 
stopped short of embracing full-fledged, cost-based, subsidy-free rates339 
Platform access rates are further distorted by the fact that long-distance 
providers are required to pay into the universal service fund, whereas 
information service providers are not.340 
 Unbundled access rates are required to be calculated in a different 
manner. The statute requires that UNE access rates be “based on the cost 
(determined without reference to a rate-of-return or other rate-based 
proceeding) of providing the interconnection or network element.”341  
The FCC implemented this requirement through TELRIC, which is 
based on the forward-looking incremental costs of a hypothetical network 
providing service through the most efficient technology at the locations of 
the existing wire centers. Like platform access rates, unbundled access 
rates are built from the bottom up. However, the absence of implicit 
subsidies and the rejection of a methodology based on historical cost in 
favor of one based on the replacement cost of a network employing the 
most efficient current technology leads to widely disparate results. 
 Finally, interconnection access is governed by the reciprocal 
compensation provisions of the 1996 Act, which mandates that rates 
provide for “the mutual and reciprocal recovery by each carrier of costs 
associated with the transport and termination on each carrier's network 
facilities of calls that originate on the network facilities of the other 
carrier.”342 The statute specifically does not “preclude arrangements that 
afford the mutual recovery of costs through the offsetting of reciprocal 
obligations, including arrangements that waive mutual recovery (such as 
bill-and-keep arrangements).”343  
As noted above, the FCC has implemented interconnection access 
through TELRIC, although it is considering replacing TELRIC with bill 
and keep. 344 
 The result is that different methodologies apply to rates established 
for each different type of access. The inconsistency raises the possibility 
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that firms will attempt to manipulate the categories of access in order to 
engage in regulatory arbitrage. The most prominent example of this is the 
controversy over UNE-P. A carrier that wished to compete by reselling the 
facilities of an incumbent local telephone company has two choices. The 
most straightforward way is to invoke the resale provisions of the 1996 Act 
and purchase wholesale access to the entire network at wholesale prices. 
Regulators set wholesale access rates at fifteen percent to twenty-five 
percent below full retail.345 At the same time, wholesale access can be 
duplicated simply by using unbundled access to purchase all of the 
elements necessary to provide local service. In contrast to the top-down 
approach to wholesale access prices, in which wholesale access prices are 
based on deductions from full retail prices, UNE access prices are 
calculated from the bottom up based on the long-run incremental cost of 
particular network elements. Until the deregulation of mass market 
switching effectively abolished UNE-P in 2005, new entrants were able to 
leverage the differences in the pricing to obtain wholesale access at rates 
substantially below what those regulators deemed appropriate.346 
 The opportunity for regulatory arbitrage will remain so long as access 
mandates remain in place and differences in the methodologies for 
calculating access rates persist. Eventually, the advent of competition will 
obviate the need to harmonize these pricing regimes by eliminating the 
need for imposing access requirements in the first place. 
V. CONCLUSION 
The telecommunications industry has undergone a fundamental 
transformation in the years following the breakup of AT&T. Technological 
progress has continued to open more areas of the industry to competition. 
Perhaps most strikingly, breakthrough developments in network technology 
has made it possible for competition to emerge, not only in complementary 
telecommunications services, such as long distance, CPE, and information 
services, but also in the basic transportation services provided by local 
telephone networks. Indeed, the digitization of electronic communications 
may cause the distinction between basic and complementary services to 
collapse altogether. 
This technological revolution has been accompanied by a conceptual 
revolution that has been equally transformative. Breakthroughs in the 
economics of industrial organization have altered our notions of market 
failure and provided new insights into how private ordering can solve many 
problems once believed to require regulatory intervention. Particularly 
when combined with the growing appreciation of the limits of the tools 
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used to implement regulation, these technological and conceptual advances 
have opened up the policy space in new and exciting ways. 
The problem is that our nation’s telecommunications policy has 
struggled to keep up with these changes. Our regulatory regime continues 
to invoke regulatory justifications and to adhere to cost-based approaches 
whose relevance shrinks with every passing year. Moreover, many aspects 
of the current regime are largely the result of the industry’s regulatory 
history. The result is a confused jumble of contradictory policies that are 
vulnerable to regulatory arbitrage. 
Most problematic is that current policymaking has failed to capture 
what is perhaps networks’ most distinctive feature, which is their ability to 
compensate for disruptions to the network by rerouting traffic along 
different paths. In short, current policy conceives of networks as 
aggregations of individual components without taking into account the way 
that interactions among particular network components can cause them to 
respond in sharply discontinuous and unpredictable ways. 
This Article attempts to address these shortcomings by offering a 
critical reassessment of the rationales traditionally invoked to justify the 
regulation of local telephone networks. It also lays out an integrated 
framework for modeling network behavior that captures the importance of 
network configuration and the interactions among individual network 
components. It applies a five-part framework for categorizing different 
types of access to assess how each type of access has a different impact on 
network cost, configuration, capacity, and reliability. Lastly, it draws on 
Coase’s theory of the firm to show how mandating access alters networks’ 
natural boundaries and increases their transaction costs by forcing them to 
externalize functions that would more economically be handled inside the 
boundary of the firm. 
What results is an approach of considerable analytical power. We 
recognize that we have barely scratched the surface of the insights that 
graph theory can provide into telecommunications policy. We hope that 
future work will explore further implications of our approach. That said, 
even without any further extensions or refinements, the importance of 
modeling networks as complex systems should be apparent. 
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